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  1. (1 other version)Act, aim, and unscientific explanation.Larry Hauser - 1992 - Philosophical Investigations 15 (4):313-323.
    Against the claim that folk psychology is a theory, I contend thatfolk psychology is not empirically vulnerable in the same way theories are, and has evaluative functions that make it irreplaceable by a scientific theory. It is neither would-be nor has-been science.
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  • Mental anomaly and the new mind-brain reductionism.John Bickle - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (2):217-30.
    Davidson's principle of the anomalousness of the mental was instrumental in discrediting once-popular versions of mind-brain reductionism. In this essay I argue that a novel account of intertheoretic reduction, which does not require the sort of cross-theoretic bridge laws that Davidson's principle rules out, allows a version of mind-brain reductionism which is immune from Davidson's challenge. In the final section, I address a second worry about reductionism, also based on Davidson's principle, that survives this response. I argue that new reductionists (...)
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  • (1 other version)Act, Aim, and Unscientific Explanation.Larry Hauser - 2008 - Philosophical Investigations 15 (4):313-323.
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