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  1. Arguments From Authority and Expert Opinion in Computational Argumentation Systems.Douglas Walton & Marcin Koszowy - 2017 - AI and Society 32 (4):483-496.
    In this paper we show that an essential aspect of solving the problem of uncritical acceptance of expert opinions that is at the root of the ad verecundiam fallacy is the need to disentangle argument from expert opinion from another kind of appeal to authority. Formal and computational argumentation systems enable us to analyze the fault in which an error has occurred by virtue of a failure to meet one or more of the requirements of the argumentation scheme from argument (...)
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  • Can Asserting That P Improve the Speaker's Epistemic Position (And Is That a Good Thing)?Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):157-170.
    In this paper I argue that there are cases in which a speaker S's observation of the fact that her assertion that p is accepted by another person enhances the strength of S's own epistemic position with respect to p, as compared to S's strength of epistemic position with respect to p prior to having made the assertion. I conclude by noting that the sorts of consideration that underwrite this possibility may go some distance towards explaining several aspects of our (...)
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  • On the Nature of Belief in Pluralistic Ignorance.Marco Antonio Joven-Romero - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (1):23-45.
    I apply recent research on the links between belief, truth and pragmatism based on Williams statement that “beliefs aim at truth,” to the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, in which agents act contrary to their private beliefs because they believe that other agents believe the contrary. I consider three positions; an epistemic position, a pragmatic position, and a third position coordinating the first two. I apply them to pluralistic ignorance while considering the recent study of Bjerring, Hansend and Pedersen. I conclude (...)
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  • The Irrationality of Pluralistic Ignorance.Daniel Grosz - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):195-208.
    Pluralistic ignorance is a social-psychological phenomenon in which an agent believes that their attitudes, feelings, and beliefs are different from those of others, despite the fact that their public behavior is identical. I argue that agents in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance are epistemically irrational. I accomplish this, first, by rebutting a recent argument for the rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Next, I offer a defeat-based argument against the epistemic rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Third, I examine a type of case in (...)
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  • A Logic for Diffusion in Social Networks.Zoé Christoff & Jens Ulrik Hansen - 2015 - Journal of Applied Logic 13 (1):48-77.
    This paper introduces a general logical framework for reasoning about diffusion processes within social networks. The new “Logic for Diffusion in Social Networks” is a dynamic extension of standard hybrid logic, allowing to model complex phenomena involving several properties of agents. We provide a complete axiomatization and a terminating and complete tableau system for this logic and show how to apply the framework to diffusion phenomena documented in social networks analysis.
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