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  1. On a derivation of the necessity of identity.John P. Burgess - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1-19.
    The source, status, and significance of the derivation of the necessity of identity at the beginning of Kripke’s lecture “Identity and Necessity” is discussed from a logical, philosophical, and historical point of view.
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  • (1 other version)Ruth Barcan Marcus and quantified modal logic.Frederique Janssen-Lauret - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 30 (2):353-383.
    Analytic philosophy in the mid-twentieth century underwent a major change of direction when a prior consensus in favour of extensionalism and descriptivism made way for approaches using direct reference, the necessity of identity, and modal logic. All three were first defended, in the analytic tradition, by one woman, Ruth Barcan Marcus. But analytic philosophers now tend to credit them to Kripke, or Kripke and Carnap. I argue that seeing Barcan Marcus in her historical context – one dominated by extensionalism and (...)
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  • Marcus and the new theory of reference: A reply to Scott Soames.Quentin Smith - 1995 - Synthese 104 (2):217-244.
    This paper is a reply to some of Scott Soames ' comments on my colloquium paper Marcus, Kripke, and the Origin of the New Theory of Reference. Except for the indicated parts added in May, 1995, this paper was written on December 16th–25th, 1994 as my reply to Soames for the APA colloquium in Boston, December 28, 1994. In this paper, I argue that Soames ' contention that Marcus is not one of the primary founders of contemporary nondescriptivist theories of (...)
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  • Abstraction in Fitch's Basic Logic.Eric Thomas Updike - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):215-243.
    Fitch's basic logic is an untyped illative combinatory logic with unrestricted principles of abstraction effecting a type collapse between properties (or concepts) and individual elements of an abstract syntax. Fitch does not work axiomatically and the abstraction operation is not a primitive feature of the inductive clauses defining the logic. Fitch's proof that basic logic has unlimited abstraction is not clear and his proof contains a number of errors that have so far gone undetected. This paper corrects these errors and (...)
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