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  1. Probability weighting for losses and for gains among smallholder farmers in Uganda.Arjan Verschoor & Ben D’Exelle - 2020 - Theory and Decision 92 (1):223-258.
    Probability weighting is a marked feature of decision-making under risk. For poor people in rural areas of developing countries, how probabilities are evaluated matters for livelihoods decisions, especially the probabilities associated with losses. Previous studies of risky choice among poor people in developing countries seldom consider losses and do not offer a refined tracking of the probability-weighting function. We investigate probability weighting among smallholder farmers in Uganda, separately for losses and for gains, using a method that allows refined tracking of (...)
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  • Testing transitivity in choice under risk.Michael H. Birnbaum & Ulrich Schmidt - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (4):599-614.
    Recently proposed models of risky choice imply systematic violations of transitivity of preference. This study explored whether people show the predicted intransitivity of the two models proposed to account for the certainty effect in Allais paradoxes. In order to distinguish “true” violations from those produced by “error,” a model was fit in which each choice can have a different error rate and each person can have a different pattern of preferences that need not be transitive. Error rate for a choice (...)
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  • The voting paradox … with a single voter? Implications for transitivity in choice under risk.David Butler & Pavlo Blavatskyy - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):61-79.
    The voting paradox occurs when a democratic society seeking to aggregate individual preferences into asocialpreference reaches an intransitive ordering. However it is not widely known that the paradox may also manifest for anindividualaggregating over attributes of risky objects to form a preference over those objects. When this occurs, the relation ‘stochastically greater than’ is not always transitive and so transitivity need not hold between those objects. We discuss the impact of other decision paradoxes to address a series of philosophical and (...)
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