Liberals conceive of territorial rights as dependent on the legitimacy of the state, which is in turn understood in terms of the state’s protection of individual rights and freedoms. Such justifications of territorial rights have difficulties in addressing the right to control immigration, which is therefore in need of additional justification. The paper considers Christopher Heath Wellman’s liberal proposal for justifying the right to control immigration, which understands the right as derivative of a general right to freedom of association held (...) collectively by the people of the state. The paper argues that state legitimacy and freedom of political association fail to connect in the way required to justify a right to control immigration. Wellman’s argument conflates the state as an institution and the people as a political collective and elides the difference between territorial jurisdiction and associational freedom. (shrink)

Muchos conservadores defienden fronteras cerradas basadas en derechos básicos de asociación. Algunos conservadores son también defensores del principio libertario de legitimidad. No es claro sin embargo que este tipo de defensa de las fronteras cerradas sea coherente con los ideales libertarios. Aquí argumento que los conservadores libertarios de este tipo deben rechazar esa clase de defensa de las fronteras cerradas porque o bien colapsa en algún tipo de estatismo incoherente con el principio libertario de legitimidad o bien colapsa en un (...) precepto ideal que no tiene ningún atractivo con respecto de la realidad aquí y ahora y que podría ser aplicado solo transformando la naturaleza de las sociedades que conocemos. Como resultado los libertarios deben buscar formas de justificación alternativas para las fronteras cerradas. (shrink)

To whom is egalitarian justice owed? Our fellow citizens, or all of humankind? If the latter, what form might a global brand of egalitarianism take? This paper examines some recent debates about the justification, and content, of global egalitarian justice. It provides an account of some keenly argued controversies about the scope of egalitarian justice, between those who would restrict it to the level of the state and those who would extend it more widely. It also notes the cross-cutting distinction (...) between relationists (whose views on scope are derived from a belief about which relations, practices or institutions give rise to the demands of equality) and non-relationists (who place no such importance on empirical facts about the relations between individuals). Beyond this, it sets out some of the different principles that might flow from a commitment to global egalitarianism. One of the key goals is to highlight the increasing diversity within debates on global justice, so that even those with a shared commitment to global equality may espouse different views about the justifications for equality, as well as the nature of, and proper sites for, egalitarian principles. (shrink)