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On Williamson’s Argument for (I _i_) in His Anti‐Luminosity Argument

Thomas A. Blackson

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):397-405 (2007)

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Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-luminosity Arguments.David de Bruijn - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details Epistemological disjunctivists hold that perceiving subjects have “reflective access” to factive perceptual support for belief. However, little has been done to elaborate the intended notion of reflection, or introspective awareness more generally. Moreover, critics have pointed out that the disjunctivist conception of “reflective access” can seem vulnerable to varieties of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. In this paper I defend disjunctivism from this charge, arguing that it holds the resources for a potent defense of the claim that knowledge of perceptual states is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Practical Knowledge and Luminosity.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1237-1267.details Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Donald Davidson, several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument relies on (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 19 citations
Some Problems with the Anti‐Luminosity‐Argument.Wim Vanrie - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):538-559.details I argue that no successful version of Williamson's anti‐luminosity‐argument has yet been presented, even if Srinivasan's further elaboration and defence is taken into account. There is a version invoking a coarse‐grained safety condition and one invoking a fine‐grained safety condition. A crucial step in the former version implicitly relies on the false premise that sufficient similarity is transitive. I show that some natural attempts to resolve this issue fail. Similar problems arise for the fine‐grained version. Moreover, I argue that Srinivasan's (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Are We Luminous?Amia Srinivasan - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):294-319.details Since its appearance over a decade ago, Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument has come under sustained attack. Defenders of the luminous overwhelmingly object to the argument's use of a certain margin-for-error premise. Williamson himself claims that the premise follows easily from a safety condition on knowledge together with his description of the thought experiment. But luminists argue that this is not so: the margin-for-error premise either requires an implausible interpretation of the safety requirement on knowledge, or it requires other equally implausible (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 60 citations
Anti-luminosity: Four unsuccessful strategies.Murali Ramachandran - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):659-673.details In Knowledge and Its Limits Timothy Williamson argues against the luminosity of phenomenal states in general by way of arguing against the luminosity of feeling cold, that is, against the view that if one feels cold, one is at least in a position to know that one does. In this paper I consider four strategies that emerge from his discussion, and argue that none succeeds. Download Export citation Bookmark 20 citations

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