Plato's dialogues show discourse strategies beyond purely intellectual methods of persuasion. The usual assumption is that linguistic understanding depends on a match of inner experiences. This is partly explained by an underlying engagement with the historical Gorgias on discourse and psychology, as well as Parmenides on philosophical logos. In the "Gorgias" and the "Symposium," speakers cannot understand alien experiences by philosophical conversation alone. There is no developed alternative model of understanding in the Platonic dialogues. The difficulties in bringing 'philistine souls' (...) into Socratic alignment are the result of possessing an inferior soul, suffering misdirected passions, or missing the philosophy bug. (shrink)

Some recent studies have shown that the critique of rhetoric in the Gorgias itself has a rhetorical dimension. The following analysis deals only with the first part of the dialogue, in which Socrates questions Gorgias, from two complementary perspec­tives. First, since it is ad hominem in character, Socrates’ argumentation mimics and transforms the techniques of contemporary rhetoric, but its goals are protreptic and ethical rather than eristic. Secondly, insofar as he is the controlling author of the dialogue,, Plato displays strategies (...) that of course are to be distinguished from Socrates’ argumentative strategies - just as the historical Gorgias is to be distinguished from the figure represented by Plato. The distinction here focusses on the problem of interpreting the different ways in which both the character Socrates and the author Plato employ irony and indirect communication. (shrink)

The motif of shame represents an interesting and hitherto neglected intersection in the discussion of the relationship between Nietzsche and Plato. The first part of the essay recapitulates the function of this motif in Nietzsche’s culminating texts (mainly Zarathustra and Gay Science), while the second part focuses on the motif of shame in Plato’s work, specifically the two extreme contexts of death (Apology, Crito) and love (Symposium). It turns out that for both authors, shame is a constitutive moral phenomenon that (...) is thematized in relation to logos. Shame and logos thus stand in close and contrasting relation. Their tension is decisive for the life of the soul, for its upward movement (Plato) or gradation (Nietzsche). It is therefore not a simple subjugation of the “bad”, irrational element by the “good”, rational component of the soul that plays the central role but an interplay of irreducible, mutually demanding moments. The interpretation of their interplay has both historical and systematic importance—it sheds new light on the relationship between these seemingly opposing philosophers and contributes to answering the following question: what is there to be ashamed of? (shrink)