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Consciousness, philosophical issues about

In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group (2003)

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  1. (1 other version)Do we know how happy we are? On some limits of affective introspection and recall.Daniel M. Haybron - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):394–428.
    This paper aims to show that widespread, serious errors in the self-assessment of affect are a genuine possibility-one worth taking very seriously. For we are subject to a variety of errors concerning the character of our present and past affective states, or "affective ignorance." For example, some affects, particularly moods, can greatly affect the quality of our experience even when we are unable to discern them. I note several implications of these arguments. First, we may be less competent pursuers of (...)
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  • Materialist spirituality?Paul Voelker - 2011 - Zygon 46 (2):451-460.
    Abstract. Contrary to proposals that seek a harmonious integration of “science and religion” or “science and spirituality,” I argue that contemporary scientific and philosophical work at the mind-brain interface gives us reason to be skeptical of many of the claims found within religious spiritualities. Religious spiritualities typically presume commitment to strong versions of metaphysical dualism, while contemporary mind science gives us every reason to think that the mind is the brain. If materialism is true, what becomes of spirituality? Materialism or (...)
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  • Dual Aspect Science.Colin Hales - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):30-73..
    Our chronically impoverished explanatory capacity in respect of P-consciousness is highly suggestive of a problem with science itself, rather than its lack of acquisition of some particular knowledge. The hidden assumption built into science is that science itself is a completed human behaviour. Removal of this assumption is achieved through a simple revision to our science model which is constructed, outlined and named ‘dual aspect science’ (DAS). It is constructed with reference to existing science being ‘single aspect science’. DAS is (...)
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  • (1 other version)Perception preattentive and phenomenal.Austen Clark - manuscript
    Recent work in experimental psychology and neuroscience has revealed a rather surprising architecture for early (or preattentive) perceptual processes. This paper will describe some of the surprising features of that architecture, and how they bear on recent philosophical debates about the notion of phenomenal consciousness. I will argue that the common sense idea that states of phenomenal consciousness are states of a unitary kind cannot survive confrontation with the details of how our early perceptual processing works. In particular, that architecture (...)
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  • (1 other version)Neurolímits.Òscar Llorens I. Garcia - 2018 - Recerca.Revista de Pensament I Anàlisi 22:15-32.
    Neuroscience promises us to explain philosophical issues, from ethics to general philosophy, as brain activity. I this paper we will propose expose the naturalistic view of neurophilosphy, show many problems of this proposal and how a dualistic ontology helps solve efficently these problems.
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