This paper re-examines the origins, meaning, and application of the notion of evil/detestable human nature in Xunzi’s thought. Commonly considered the crucial factor that determined the premodern fate of Xunzi’s project, it has regained proper scholarly attention in recent years. As part of this interest in a unique approach to moral psychology, this paper will start with a critical re-assessment of Xunzi’s immediate motivation—Mengzi’s arguments in favour of the goodness of human nature. In the subsequent steps, it will revisit Xunzi’s (...) lines of argument regarding the evil/detestable nature, as presented in the 23rd chapter of the Xunzi, Xing e, the only one in which the notion appears. It will argue that its role in Xunzi’s system had been primarily misinterpreted despite contributing to one essential debate in Chinese philosophy. The paper will demonstrate that if only one follows the lines of Xunzi’s argument, it becomes apparent that the notion of evilness/detestability of human nature serves different than a simple denouncement of human moral insufficiency purpose. On the contrary, as rooted in empirical experience of socio-moral reality constatation, the notion of evil/detestable is meant as a tool allowing for embracing the human agency in the Confucian quest for an ethical society. Such a changed perspective on Xunzi’s intention is then hoped to stimulate further research and re-assessment of Xunzi’s thought significance and utility in the context of moral psychology. (shrink)

An overview of Dai's ethics, highlighting some overlooked or misunderstood theses on moral deliberation and motivation.

The project is to traverse with quite novel questions, and as though with new eyes, the enormous, distant, and so well hidden land of morality—of morality that has actually existed, actually been lived.This essay offers a contribution to the consilience of the humanities, social sciences, and life sciences in accord with naturalism (in a spirit closer to Slingerland 2008 than Wilson 1998). Human beings have a shared nature produced by evolutionary history and modified by culture, where 'culture' refers to "information (...) capable of affecting individuals' behavior that they acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission" (Richerson and Boyd 2005, p. 5). .. (shrink)

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2008.

This essay defends a novel interpretation of the term xìng 性 as it occurs in Chinese texts of the late Warring States period (roughly 320–221 BCE). The term played an important role both in the famous controversy over the goodness or badness of people’s xìng and elsewhere in the intellectual discourse of the period. Extending especially the work of A.C. Graham, the essay stresses the importance for understanding xìng of early Chinese assumptions about spontaneity, continuity, health, and (in the human (...) case) motivation. These assumptions make xìng fundamentally different from the contemporary nature concepts with which it is often equated. In particular, people’s xìng is not a near-equivalent of human nature or (in modern Chinese) of rénxìng 人性. (shrink)

This dissertation reinterprets the notion commonly translated as "human nature" (renxing in the Mencius by appealing to philosophical assumptions common to Warring States thought. Taking advantage of recently unearthed archeological finds from the Mencian school, the argument is made that renxing in the Mencius is most adequately understood as a dynamic disposition shaped by cultural and historical conditions, not as an a-historical "nature" common to all humans at all times. The notion of "becoming human" in the Mencius that results from (...) this re-reading brings the text as a whole into focus. The central themes of the Mencius - the role of family, personal growth, moral development, and human advancement - are each understood within the framework of this alternative reading. (shrink)

Inspired by early Confucian texts such as the Analects, Mencius, and Xunzi, defenders of Confucian role ethics argue that persons are constituted by their social roles and relationships. However, this has the puzzling implication that persons cannot survive changes in social roles and relationships. This paper proposes ways to understand this claim by appealing to the notions of essence, material constitution, and four-dimensionalism. In particular, it will be suggested that role ethicists should distinguish biological humans from persons and should say (...) either that (i) persons are materially constituted by biological humans, or that (ii) persons are four-dimensional objects that merely overlap with biological humans. There has thus far not been much contact between early Chinese philosophy and contemporary metaphysics in this vein. A secondary goal of this paper is to demonstrate that views in early Chinese philosophy can be examined within frameworks from contemporary metaphysics, and furthermore, that the results include novel theses not yet recognized in contemporary metaphysics. (shrink)

_Discusses philosophers Mencius and Aristotle as socio-ecological thinkers._ Mencius (385–303/302 BCE) and Aristotle (384–322 BCE) were contemporaries, but are often understood to represent opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum. Mencius is associated with the ecological, emergent, flowing, and connected; Artistotle with the rational, static, abstract, and binary. Douglas Robinson argues that in their conceptions of rhetoric, at least, Mencius and Aristotle are much more similar than different: both are powerfully socio-ecological, espousing and exploring collectivist thinking about the circulation of energy (...) and social value through groups. The agent performing the actions of _pistis_, “persuading-and-being-persuaded,” in Aristotle and _zhi_, “governing-and-being-governed,” in Mencius is, Robinson demonstrates, not so much the rhetor as an individual as it is the whole group. Robinson tracks this collectivistic thinking through a series of comparative considerations using a theory that draws impetus from Arne Naess’s “ecosophical” deep ecology and from work on rhetoric powered by affective ecologies, but with details of the theory drawn equally from Mencius and Aristotle. (shrink)

This experimental essay intends to analyze interpretational cases related to the understanding of the Mencian theory of human nature. The first part introduces straightforward reading by a representative sinologist, historian, and philosopher. The second part discusses two examples that reinterpret the Mencian theory in an injective way with the Kantian theory and processing philosophy, respectively. The third part reexamines our understanding and evaluation of human nature in the Mencian theory using new discoveries of experimental psychology. The claim that there exists (...) a foundation of goodness in human nature has been revealed by both Mencius and modern psychologists from their own perspectives. It should be meaningful to further examine the rationale of acceptance of these theories. Such study also contributes to establishing a right attitude towards people and human societies, which in turn will influence the quality of our life in the long term. (shrink)

Critical reflections on the work of Angus Charles Graham, renowned Western scholar of Chinese philosophy and sinology.

In Menciusiia6 all humans are said to have ‘a heart that does not bear the suffering of others’. I argue that this statement is illustrated, rather than proven, by the example of our reaction to a child about to fall into a well. This illustration can be located at the most basic level of ethical universals : basic ethical training; further steps in a ladder of reflection are universal reflection on ethical norms themselves, which may finally be related universally to (...) non‐ethical concerns. (shrink)

The Confucian classic the Liji 禮記 defines ‘desire’ as ‘the arousal of nature’. In line with this classical definition, Dai Zhen 戴震 sees desire as human nature in activation. However, while the Liji ascribes human deceits and debauchery to the susceptibility of human nature, Dai Zhen speaks highly of its responsiveness and receptivity. This article discusses Dai Zhen’s conception of desire and argues that Dai Zhen distinguishes himself from other Confucian moral thinkers by bringing to light the dimension of the (...) Other in addressing the issue of desire. As the Confucian tradition has long been disturbed by an anxiety to keep desire in check, Dai Zhen draws our attention to how to cultivate the affective faculty inherent in human nature to develop our sensitivity to the needs and desires of others, especially those of the widow, the orphan, the solitary, the sick, and the weak. (shrink)

This paper examines the Adventures of Huckleberry Finn in the light of the early Confucian thinker Mencius, arguing in essence that Mencian theories of moral development and self-cultivation can help us to recover the moral significance of Twain's novel. Although 'ethical criticisms' of Huckleberry Finn share a long history, I argue that most interpretations have failed to appreciate the moral significance of Jim, either by focusing on the moral arc of Huck in isolation or by casting Jim in one-dimensional terms (...) simply as a symbol or example of human dignity. By invoking the Mencian ideas of 'moral power' ( de ), human goodness, and the virtues of sympathy and humaneness, this study attempts to bring into relief the many ways that Jim, particularly in his role as an exemplar, functions as an active force in the moral life of Huck. It is hoped that this revised Mencian reading of Huckleberry Finn can restore the moral center of the novel and contribute to the growing discussion on the virtues in moral education. (shrink)

As a 4th century BCE Confucian text, Mencius provides a rich reflection on moral emotions, such as empathy and compassion, and moral cultivation, which has drawn attention from scholars around the world. This two-part discussion dwells on the idea of natural moral motivation expressed through the analogy of the four sprouts—particularly the sprout of ceyin zhixin (the heart of feelings others' distress)—as the starting point, the focus, and the drive of moral cultivation. In Part 1, I presented an integrated view (...) of the sprouts as including cognitive, affective, and motivational aspects. In Part 2, I discuss the cultivation and application of natural moral motivation. I illustrate how the sprouts inform moral deliberation and drive moral cultivation, while also being its subject. I also demonstrate how emotional responses are managed and regulated according to the sprouts and discuss why moral cultivation is sometimes unsuccessful. (shrink)