This paper provides a definitive answer, based on considerations derived from first-order logic, to the question regarding the status of elementary geometry, whether elementary geometry can be reduced to algebra. The answer we arrive at is negative, and is based on a series of structural questions that can be asked only inside the geometric formal theory, as well as the consideration of reverse geometry, which is the art of finding minimal axiom systems strong enough to prove certain geometrical theorems, given (...) that there are no algebraic structures that one could associate with those minimal axiom systems. (shrink)

Mathematical texts raise particular dilemmas for the translator. With its arm’s-length relation to verbal expression and long-standing “mathematics is written for mathematicians” ethos, mathematics lends itself awkwardly to textually centered analysis. Otherwise sound standards of historical scholarship can backfire when rigidly upheld in a mathematical context. Mathematically inclined historians have had more faith in a purported empathic sixth sense—and there is a case to be made that this is how mathematical authors have generally expected their works to be read—but it (...) is difficult to pin down exact evidentiary standards for this supposed instinct. This essay urges that both of these points of view, for all the tension between them, be kept in the historian’s toolbox. It illustrates these considerations with a case study from the Ptolemaic astronomical tradition on computing lunar model parameters from eclipse data. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to our understanding of the technical concept of given in Greek mathematical texts. By working through mathematical arguments by Menaechmus, Euclid, Apollonius, Heron and Ptolemy, I elucidate the meaning of given in various mathematical practices. I next show how the concept of given is related to the terms discussed by Marinus in his philosophical discussion of Euclid’s Data. I will argue that what is given does not simply exist, but can be unproblematically assumed or produced (...) through some effective procedure. Arguments by givens are shown to be general claims about constructibility and computability. The claim that an object is given is related to our concept of an assignment—what is given is available in some uniquely determined, or determinable, way for future mathematical work. (shrink)