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this book concerns the debates on the functions of "imagination" (phantasia, imaginatio) in the arousal of passions in the Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian traditions till the XVIIth Century. The simple fact that often a mental representation is followed by pleasure or sorrow and that these emotions can cause actions, became progressively part of a wider theory of animal and human behaviour. In the case of human behaviour, the "force of imagination" became a kind of general justification of all kind of anomic (...) |
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In this paper I offer an analysis of Plotinus’ argument for the existence of a quasi-psychic entity, the so-called ‘trace of soul’, that functions as an immanent cause of life for an organism’s body. I argue that Plotinus posits this entity primarily in order to account for the body’s possession of certain quasi-psychic states that are instrumental in his account of soul-body interaction. Since these quasi-psychic states imply that an organism’s body has vitality of its own , and Platonic souls (...) |
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This paper focuses on Plotinus’ account of the soul’s cognitive powers of sense perception and discursive thought, with particular reference to the treatises 3. 6 [26], 4. 4 [28] and 5. 3 [49] of the Enneads . Part 1 of the paper discusses Plotinus’ direct realism in perception. Parts 2 and 3 focus on Plotinus’ account of knowledge in Enneads 5. 3 [49] 2–3. Plotinus there argues that we make judgements regarding how the external world is by means of discursive (...) |
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The universe is the result of a production that pertains not to craft, but to nature. This production does not involve either reasoning or concepts, but is the result of a power that acts on matter like an imprint. The Intellect transmits the intelligible forms it harbors, to the hypostasis Soul, where they become rational formulas. The hypostasis Soul then transmits these rational formulas to the world soul, which produces animate and inanimate beings, as if it had been ordered to (...) |
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Plotinus maintains that our intellect is always thinking. This is due to his view that our intellect remains in the intelligible world and shares a natural kinship with the hypostasis Intellect, whose being and activity consists in eternal contemplation of the Forms. Moreover, Plotinus maintains that although our intellect is always thinking we do not always apprehend our thoughts. This is due to his view that “we“ descend into the sensible world while our intellect remains in the intelligible world. Furthermore, (...) |
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This study traces the notion of the internal senses in three ancient authors, namely Nemesius, Plotinus and Galen. It begins with Nemesius, and then by going backward ends with Galen. The textual evidence investigated in this study shows clearly that Galen, after acknowledging the Platonic tripartite soul, locates the various dunameis of the soul in the brain. The “localization” theory of Galen plays a crucial role in paving the way for the foundation of the internal senses, which both Plotinus and (...) |
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_ Source: _Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 129 - 145 The aim of this paper is to highlight the importance of ἕξις in Plotinus’ virtue ethics. It is argued that since ἕξις signifies a quality of being in a permanent state of possession and virtue is defined as an ἕξις that intellectualizes the soul, therefore, it is suggested that virtue is an active ἕξις of the soul directed higher to the intelligible world in permanent contemplation of the Forms. |
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I examine the relation between sensation and discursive thought in Plato, Plotinus, and Proclus. In Theaetetus, a soul whose highest faculty was sensation would have no unified experience of the sensible world, lacking universal ideas to give order to the sensible flux. It is implied that such universals are grasped by the soul’s thinking. In Plotinus the soul is not passive when it senses the world, but as the logos of all things it thinks the world through its own forms.Proclus (...) |
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This paper argues that the duality of phantasia consists not in its being divided between two faculties, but in its being the meeting point of two representations. First it is argued that Plotinus’ theory, according to which the representation is a judgement, rests on his reading of Theaetetus 184c–187a and its criticism in De Anima III, 2–3. Second, it is argued that the ‘image’ in which the Plotinian representation consists follows the perceptual judgement instead of preceding it. Third, it is (...) |
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Though “mysticism” in not a Plotinian idiom, it has been frequently used by scholars to identify an aspect of his philosophy. Thus, Plotinus’ mysticism comprises those passages of the Enneads in which he describes different transcendent experiences or presents his interpretation of these. Upon these two elements, we believe, Plotinus structures a coherent doctrine about the relation between man and the higher degrees of reality closely dependant, as well, on his metaphysical theory. In the present work we intend to provide (...) |
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