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A two-tiered cognitive architecture for moral reasoning

John Bolender

Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):339-356 (2001)

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Before Virtue: Biology, Brain, Behavior, and the “Moral Sense”.Eugene Sadler-Smith - 2012 - Business Ethics Quarterly 22 (2):351-376.details ABSTRACT:Biological, brain, and behavioral sciences offer strong and growing support for the virtue ethics account of moral judgment and ethical behavior in business organizations. The acquisition of moral agency in business involves the recognition, refinement, and habituation through the processes of reflexion and reflection of a moral sense encapsulated in innate modules for compassion, hierarchy, reciprocity, purity, and affiliation adaptive for communal life both in ancestral and modern environments. The genetic and neural bases of morality exist independently of institutional frameworks (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 18 citations
Intuition as a basic source of moral knowledge.Thomas W. Smythe & Thomas G. Evans - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):233-247.details The idea that intuition plays a basic role in moral knowledge and moral philosophy probably began in the eighteenth century. British philosophers such as Anthony Shaftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, and later David Hume talk about a “moral sense” that they place in John Locke’s theory of knowledge in terms of Lockean reflexive perceptions, while Richard Price seeks a faculty by which we obtain our ideas of right and wrong. In the twentieth century intuitionism in moral philosophy was revived by (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The genealogy of the moral modules.John Bolender - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (2):233-255.details This paper defends a cognitive theory of those emotional reactions which motivate and constrain moral judgment. On this theory, moral emotions result from mental faculties specialized for automatically producing feelings of approval or disapproval in response to mental representations of various social situations and actions. These faculties are modules in Fodor's sense, since they are informationally encapsulated, specialized, and contain innate information about social situations. The paper also tries to shed light on which moral modules there are, which of these (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
The methods of ethics. Conflicts built to last.Björn Eriksson - unknowndetails An impressive amount of evidence from psychology, cognitive neurology, evolutionary psychology and primatology seems to be converging on a ‘dual process’ model of moral or practical (in the philosophical sense) psychology according to which our practical judgments are generated by two distinct processes, one ‘emotive-intuitive’ and one ‘cognitive-utilitarian’. In this paper I approach the dual process model from several directions, trying to shed light on various aspects of our moral and practical lives. Download Export citation Bookmark
Evolutionary psychology -- towards a more integrative model.Frederick Toates - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (2-3):305-328.details Aspects of the history of behavioural science are reviewed, pointing to its fragmented and faction-ridden nature. The emergence of evolutionary psychology (EP) is viewed in this context. With the help of a dual-layered model of behavioural control, the case is made for a more integrative perspective towards EP. The model's application to both behaviour and complex human information processing is described. Similarities in their control are noted. It is suggested that one layer of control (‘on-line’) corresponds to the encapsulated modules (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

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