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  1. The claim-right to exclude and the right to do wrong.Sahar Akhtar - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.
    Most challenges to immigration restrictions have not shown that states lack a claim-right to exclude, or a moral right against outside interference to make membership decisions. And an important, unexamined aspect of the claim-right is that states have the right against interference to wrongfully exclude, or the right to do wrong when making admission decisions. A major implication of this right is that even political or economic measures to affect states’ immigration policies are off the table – significantly compromising the (...)
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  • What is morality?Kieran Setiya - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1113-1133.
    Argues, against Anscombe, that Aristotle had the concept of morality as an interpersonal normative order: morality is justice in general. For an action to be wrong is not for it to warrant blame, or to wrong another person, but to be something one should not do that one has no right to do. In the absence of rights, morality makes no sense.
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  • From rights to prerogatives.Daniel Muñoz - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):608-623.
    Deontologists believe in two key exceptions to the duty to promote the good: restrictions forbid us from harming others, and prerogatives permit us not to harm ourselves. How are restrictions and prerogatives related? A promising answer is that they share a source in rights. I argue that prerogatives cannot be grounded in familiar kinds of rights, only in something much stranger: waivable rights against oneself.
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  • Privacy and the Importance of ‘Getting Away With It’.Cressida Gaukroger - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (4):416-439.
    One reason people value privacy is that it allows them to do or think bad things – things that, if made public, would warrant blame, censure, or punishment. Privacy protects several types of freedom – and one of these is the freedom to be bad. This paper will argue that this is a good thing.
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  • Letting others do wrong.Tyler Doggett - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):40-56.
    It is sometimes—but not always—permissible to let others do wrong. This paper is about why that is so.
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