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The real Molyneux question and the basis of Locke's answer

Martha Brandt Bolton

In Graham Alan John Rogers (ed.), Locke's philosophy: content and context. New York: Oxford University Press (1994)

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(1 other version)Locke on perception.Michael Jacovides - 2015 - In Matthew Stuart (ed.), A Companion to Locke. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell.details Michael Jacovides For Locke, the first step in inquiring into perception should be reflection: “What Perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, etc. or thinks, than by any discourse of mine” (2.9.2). As a second step, I say, we may learn from reading him. Locke’s use of the term ‘perception’ is somewhat broad. At one point, he tells us that “having Ideas and Perception” are “the same thing” (2.1.9). (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Is Locke’s answer to Molyneux’s question inconsistent? Cross-modal recognition and the sight–recognition error.Anna Vaughn - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (5):670-688.details Molyneux’s question asks whether someone born blind, who could distinguish cubes from spheres using his tactile sensation, could recognize those objects if he received his sight. Locke says no: the newly sighted person would fail to point to the cube and call it a cube. Locke never provided a complete explanation for his negative response, and there are concerns of inconsistency with other important aspects of his theory of ideas. These charges of inconsistency rest upon an unrecognized and unfounded assumption (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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