This work sought to examine the epistemic implications of St. Thomas Aquinas’ just war theory on global peace. The intersection of war and peace is a recurring decimal in the history of philosophy. Hence, Thomas Aquinas’ just war theory emanates to address the ethical issue revolving around war and peace. This work makes use of analytic and critical methods. The work posits that Thomas Aquinas’ just war theory deals with the principle of jus ad bellum. Secondly, his just war theory (...) is intended or aimed at lasting peace which has connection with the postulation of jus in bello. Hence, Thomas Aquinas notion of lasting peace as the ultimate goal of war has to do with another important principle of just war theory—the jus post bellum. Finally, this work conceives that peace building or reconciliation ought to be extended beyond the confines of international or internal conflicts to promote global or international peace. Global peace is not a natural attainment rather it is something that needs to be constructed. There is the need for building and rebuilding of the global world on the principles of justice and peace by ending violence. (shrink)

I argue that Descartes intended the so-called ontological "argument" as a self-validating intuition, rather than as a formal proof. The textual evidence for this view is highly compelling, but the strongest support comes from understanding Descartes's diagnosis for why God's existence is not 'immediately' self-evident to everyone and the method of analysis that he develops for making it self-evident. The larger aim of the paper is to use the ontological argument as a case study of Descartes's nonformalist theory of deduction (...) and his method of analysis, showing how he conceives the latter as a form of philosophical therapy. (shrink)

This paper argues that a naturalized epistemology of the kind presented by W.V. Quine preserves everything worthwhile in traditional epistemology. Arguments against Quinean naturalism by such writers as Laurence BonJour, Jaegwon Kim, Richard Rorty, Barry Stroud, and Donald Davidson are criticized. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, Quinean naturalism does not reject a priori justification. The important point is that epistemology is contained in science. There is no ‘first philosophy’, and, in particular, epistemology is not a normative discipline. Nevertheless, there (...) is a sense in which Quinean naturalism provides an answer to Cartesian scepticism. (shrink)

The study extends and tests the issue contingent four-component model of ethical decision-making to include moral obligation. A web-based questionnaire was used to gauge the influence of perceived importance of an ethical issue on moral judgment and moral intent. Perceived importance of an ethical issue was found to be a predictor of moral judgment but not of moral intent as predicted. Moral obligation is suggested to be a process that occurs after a moral judgment is made and explained a significant (...) portion of the variance in moral intent. (shrink)

This paper critiques enlightenment notions of representation and rehearses an alternative model of mapping that is grounded in performance. Working from her own practice as a landscape painter, Bolt argues that the particular experience of the “glare” of Australian light fractures the nexus between light, form, knowledge, and subjectivity. This rupture prompts a move from shedding light ON the matter to shedding light FOR the matter and suggests an emergent rather than a representational practice.

Contributed paper concerns the misleading ways of argumentation caused by ambiguity of natural language as Aristotle describes them in his writing On Sophistical Refutations. It will be shown that traditional and generally accepted interpretation of these paralogisms is inappropriate and new solution will be proposed.

After a brief review of the notions of necessity and a priority, this paper scrutinizes Kripke's arguments for supposedly contingent a priori propositions and necessary a posteriori propositions involving proper names, and reaches a negative conclusion, i.e. there are no such propositions, or at least the propositions Kripke gives as examples are not such propositions. All of us, including Kripke himself, still have to face the old question raised by Hume, i.e. how can we justify the necessity and universality of (...) general statements on the basis of sensory or empirical evidence? (shrink)

The difference for present purposes between ourselves and stones, chairs and our computers is that we are conscious. The difference is fundamental. Being conscious is sufficient for having a mind in one sense of the word ‘mind’, and being conscious is necessary and fundamental to having a mind in any decent sense.Whatis this difference between ourselves and stones, chairs and our computers? The question is not meant to imply that there is a conceptual or a nomic barrier in the way (...) of non-biological things being conscious. It may happen one decade that the other minds problem will shoot up the philosophical agenda and get a lot of attention as a result of a wonderful computer attached to perceptual and behavioural mechanisms, and that the thing will in the end be taken as conscious, rightly. Our question is not what things can be conscious, but what the Property or nature of consciousness is. (shrink)

An interaction paradigm continues to predominate in social communication models to this day and yet often tends to be heavily intuitive, epistemologically conservative and acritical. This article seeks to examine some of the implications for our intuitive understanding of interaction when greater instability is introduced into social communication theory where communication is conceptualized as a complex uncertainty. The theoretical architecture of this undertaking is in itself interdisciplinary, comprising concepts from the fields of social theory, logic, information theory and constructivism. In (...) these interdisciplinary considerations, interaction is conceptualized as a fictional construction and thus disabused of the strong transcendental claims which accompany concepts of dialogism, consensus or intersubjectivity. Whereas uncertainty is customarily seen as the opposite of rational inclusive communication and a risk to be somehow avoided, this article explores a different theoretical modelling of the relationship between uncertainty and social communication. Here, communication is conceived as an extremely precarious undertaking. This very precariousness is a fact of everyday life where communication is social construction in progress and norms are constantly regenerated, negotiated and challenged. (shrink)

Many Individuals currently identified within the academic world as ‘“professional” philosophers’ spend a great deal of time arguing about the meaning of their discipline. The situation has recently become so critical that the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, for example, self-consciously excludes the term ‘philosophy’ from its list of entries. An outsider might get the impression that members of the profession suffer from a recurrent kind of intellectual amnesia and need constantly to be reminded about who they are and what their (...) function is. (shrink)