In a crisis, managers are confronted with a dilemma between their ethical responsibility to respond to victims and their fiduciary responsibility to protect shareholder value. In this study, we use a unique and comprehensive dataset of 223 non-financial crises between 1983 and 2013 to investigate how corporate apologies affect stock prices. Our empirical evidence shows that the stock price response from apologizing depends on the firm’s level of responsibility for the crisis. We find that to protect shareholder value, management needs (...) to match its formal response strategy with the degree of its responsibility for the crisis. Further, failing to match the proper response is harmful to shareholders: Both apologizing when the firm is not directly responsible for the crisis and failing to apologize when the firm is directly responsible reduce shareholder wealth. However, apologizing for a crisis when the firm is directly responsible mitigates losses to shareholder value that arise because of the crisis, as does refraining from apologizing when the firm is not directly responsible. (shrink)

Using data on shareholder-initiated class action lawsuits in the US, I investigate the corporate scandals of US-listed foreign firms. The shareholders of scandal firms suffer considerable loss in both the short term and the long term. I document that firms domiciled in countries with weak institutions are more likely to be embroiled in corporate scandals, but such a relation can be moderated by the presence of Big 4 auditors. Investors automatically adjust for undiscovered misconduct when valuing the stocks of non-scandal (...) firms. Investors rely on the audit quality to form their expectations about the severity of undiscovered misconduct, and thus impose less negative spillovers on firms with Big 4 auditors, especially when the firms are from countries with weak institutions. Taken together, my results suggest that listing on US exchanges does not fully compensate for weak local institutions; voluntarily bonding to a more stringent audit process has an incremental effect on protecting shareholder interests and enhances the confidence of investors in firms’ financial integrity. (shrink)

Using two experiments, I examine how apologizing for fraud influences investor's avoidance and revenge behavior. Investors in experiment one report how many shares they would sell and how likely they would be to pursue legal punishment after discovering fraud has occurred in an organization they are currently invested in and subsequently reading about management's response to the fraud. I manipulate the nature of fraud as fraudulent financial reporting or asset misappropriation. I also manipulate whether management apologizes, scapegoats responsibility, or remains (...) silent after the fraud. Results show avoidance and revenge behavior is more negative after misreporting fraud. Data suggest that this difference may be partially attributable to the underlying moral norm that is violated. Specifically, misreporting is primarily a moral violation of deception, whereas embezzlement is primarily a moral violation of stealing. Results also show differential investor reactions depending on the type of fraud and management's response. For misreporting, revenge behavior is higher when management apologizes, but there is no effect on avoidance behavior. For embezzlement, avoidance behavior is reduced when the organization apologizes, but revenge behavior is unaffected. In experiment two, I replicate the misreporting condition from experiment one and manipulate apology sincerity. Results show that apology sincerity is positively associated with revenge behavior. Results of these two experiments extend both accounting and trust repair research by emphasizing the importance of disentangling moral integrity-based trust violations and that the adage of "just say you're sorry" is helpful in some situations and harmful in others. (shrink)