Normative error theorists maintain the view that normative judgements ascribe normative properties, but these normative properties don’t exist. Many philosophers have tried objecting to this view, like Case (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(1), 92–104, 2019) arguing that it faces self-defeat. Others, like Streumer (Journal of Philosophy, 110(4), 194–212, 2013), have argued that it can’t even be believed because beliefs (in the full, rational sense) possess certain normative requirements. So, there is no self-defeating ‘belief’ in normative error theory. Recently, Taccolini (European (...) Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 20(1), 131-154, 2024) has accepted that Streumer’s response to self-defeat might work, and builds a stronger self-defeat argument. The argument attempts to illustrate that one cannot defend the normative error theory, regardless of whether they believe it or not. In response, we illustrate various plausible interpretations of ‘defense’ that are consistent with error theory, thereby diffusing the modal objection that one can’t defend error theory. (shrink)

Many moral realists have employed a strategy for arguing for moral realism by claiming that if epistemic normativity is categorical and that if this epistemic normativity exists, then categorical normativity exists. In this paper, we will discuss that argument, examine a way out, and respond to the objections people have recently raised in the literature. In the end, we conclude that the objections to our way out will do little in the way of motivating those who already do not believe (...) in categorical normativity, thereby severing the power the aforementioned parity argument is designed to possess. (shrink)