Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Feeling “Without Any Name”.Otniel E. Dror - forthcoming - Emotion Review.
    In this commentary, I briefly present in chronological order several historical developments which can explain some of the confusions with respect to arousal that have become entrenched in the contemporary debate. These historical developments include: Immanuel Kant's eighteenth-century division of the affects into sthenic vs. asthenic; the emergence of modern conceptions of pleasure and displeasure in the West; the nineteenth-century alignment of pleasure and displeasure with “sthenic” and “asthenic” in psycho-physiology; the early-twentieth-century disruption of this nineteenth-century alignment; the establishment of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Kant and Stoic Affections.Melissa Merritt - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):329-350.
    I examine the significance of the Stoic theory of pathē for Kant’s moral psychology, arguing against the received view that systematic differences block the possibility of Kant’s drawing anything more than rhetoric from his Stoic sources. More particularly, I take on the chronically underexamined assumption that Kant is committed to a psychological dualism in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, positing distinct rational and nonrational elements of human mentality. By contrast, Stoics take the mentality of an adult human being to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Can we Modify our Pleasures? A New Look at Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable.Erica A. Holberg - 2020 - Kantian Review 25 (3):365-388.
    Many of us are all too familiar with the experience of taking pleasure in things we feel we ought not, and of finding it frustratingly hard to bring our pleasures into line with our moral judgements. As a value dualist, Kant draws a sharp contrast between the two sources of practical motivation: pleasure in the agreeable and respect for the moral law. His ethics might thus seem to be an unpromising source for help in thinking about how we can bring (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Good Enough Heart: Kant and the Cultivation of Emotions.Krista K. Thomason - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (3):441-462.
    One way of understanding Kant’s views about moral emotions is the cultivation view. On this view, emotions play a role in Kantian morality provided they are properly cultivated. I evince a sceptical position about the cultivation view. First, I show that the textual evidence in support of cultivation is ambiguous. I then provide an account of emotions in Kant’s theory that explains both his positive and negative views about them. Emotions capture our attention such that they both disrupt the mind’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Kant's apathology of compassion.Wolfram Bergande - 2014 - In Schreel Louis (ed.), Schreel, Louis (Ed.): Pathology & Aesthetics. Essays on the Pathological in Kant and Contemporary Aesthetics. Duesseldorf University Press. pp. 11-47.
    In his critical and his later work, Kant recommends apathy to the moral agent faced with pathological phenomena. Notoriously, Kant even rejects compassion (Mitleiden) as pathological. A deconstruction of Kant's 'apathology', i.e. of his systematic treatment of compassion, reveals disgust as quasi-transcendental affect at the roots of the moral agent's apathy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Which Emotions Should Kantians Cultivate (and Which Ones Should they Discipline)?Uri Eran - 2020 - Kantian Review 25 (1):53-76.
    Commentators disagree about Kant’s view on the proper treatment of emotions. In contrast to a tendency in this literature to treat them uniformly, I argue that, according to Kant, feelings (but not affects) require cultivation, and inclinations – although they can and perhaps may be cultivated – generally require discipline. The appropriate treatment for emotions depends on their susceptibility to rational constraint and on the threat they pose to rational deliberation. Although I read Kant as recommending that we cultivate certain (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations