Koopman’s book revolves around the notion of transition, which he proposes is one of the central ideas of the pragmatist tradition but one which had not previously been fully articulated yet nevertheless shapes the pragmatist attitude in philosophy. Transition, according to Koopman, denotes “those temporal structures and historical shapes in virtue of which we get from here to there”. One of the consequences of transitionalism is the understanding of critique and inquiry as historical pro...

Larry A. Hickman and Albert Borgmann have carried on a decades-long debate about the status and value of technological practices. Hickman’s work develops from the thought of John Dewey. A recent essay alleges that Hickman’s engagement with Borgmann has been superficial, particularly because full engagement would involve admitting that Dewey’s instrumentalist theory of inquiry and his aesthetics are at odds. This paper argues not only that Hickman has attended to the full scope of Borgmann’s thought but also that Dewey is (...) innocent of the criticism charged. Along the way, I develop a critique of the traditionalistic nostalgia implicit in accounts like Borgmann’s. This all serves to address the longstanding concern that pragmatism can be reduced to a crass form of instrumentalism. (shrink)

This masters thesis examines the interplay between ethics and selfhood amidst contemporary technological rationality. I use personal everyday photography as a foil in my analysis of the ways in which temporality is both constitutive of consciousness and the subject of practices of domestication via technics. In chapter one, I define personal everyday photography, address the two interconnected registers of selfhood, and advance an argument for mindfulness. In chapter two, I assess the ethical aspects of memory, temporality and thinking as they (...) relate to selfhood. In the final chapter, I relate these elements to contemporary technics, and argue that everyday personal photography supports and perpetuates the notion of static self-identity through time, and conscious self-making via practices of exclusion and elimination. In conclusion, I suggest we must exercise mindfulness in those practices that support selfness. Ultimately, ethical life might require less reliance on technological prostheses for remembering. (shrink)