This paper explores the consequences of transhumanism on free will based on the metaphysical aspect of the Botho perspective. Botho is an indigenous philosophy, prominent in Botswana, that expresses the essence of being a person. A human person from the Botho metaphysical point of view embodies material and immaterial aspects. This study seeks to answer the question: “Would certain transhuman changes to the material body affect the human person’s ability to judge and choose and hence the capacity for free will?” (...) According to the Botho perspective, determinism and free will would be compatible in unenhanced human beings. From this viewpoint, human beings are free insofar as they can act in accordance with reason, which is a determined process. This framework will be applied to hypothetically enhanced human beings and argue that transhumanism does not necessarily undermine free will. This study will also show that some forms of biotechnological enhancement could in fact improve free will, while other forms could limit free will without eliminating it. New knowledge will be gained by applying a prominent metaphysical orientation in the Botho worldview, particularly its discussion of determinism and free will, to the debate about enhancements. It will be demonstrated that most Africans, including Batswana, are soft determinists who embrace both determinism and free will so that they are not incompatible and can co-exist. (shrink)

In the debates concerning the ethics of human enhancement through biological or technological modifications, there have been several appeals to the concept of human dignity, both by those favouring such enhancement and by those opposing it. The result is the phenomenon of ‘dignity talk', where opposing sides both appeal to the concept of human dignity to ground their arguments resulting in a moral impasse. This article examines the use of the concept of human dignity in the enhancement debates and reveals (...) that the problem of dignity talk arises because proponents of various positions tend to ground human dignity in different features of the human individual. These features include species-membership, possession of a particular capacity, a sense of self-worth, and moral behaviour. The article proposes a solution to this problem by appealing to another feature of human beings, namely their being-in-relationship-over-time. Doing so enables us to understand dignity as a concept that affirms the worth of human individuals as complex, multidimensional wholes, rather than as isolated features. Consequently, the concept of human dignity can serve both a descriptive and a normative function in the enhancement debates. At a descriptive level, asking what advocates of a position mean when they refer to human dignity will reveal what aspects of being human they deem to be most valuable. The debate can then focus on these values. The normative function, although it cannot proscribe or prescribe all enhancement, approves only those enhancements that contribute to the flourishing of human individuals as multidimensional wholes. (shrink)