Our evidential environments are reflections of our social contexts. This is important because the evidence we encounter influences the beliefs we form. But, traditional epistemologists have paid little attention to the generation of this evidential environment, assuming that it is irrelevant to epistemic normativity. This assumption, I argue, is dangerous. Idealizing away the evidential environment obscures the ways that our social contexts distort its contents. Such social distortion can lead to evidential oppression, an epistemic injustice arising from the ubiquity of (...) ideologically-inflected portrayals of oppressed social groups. In some cases, this distortion can be so pervasive as to create a skeptical pothole in agents' epistemic environments---a limited region in which a skeptical scenario obtains. The skeptical challenge of social distortion is important because it suggests that prejudice and irrationality alone may not be enough to explain many harmful beliefs. Where justified belief is merely a matter of responding well to one's evidence, the ubiquity of ideologically-inflected evidence may impel a matching doxastic state, even for exemplary epistemic agents. Nevertheless, there is an asymmetry in blameworthiness between the Cartesian victim and someone laboring under evidential oppression. This asymmetry reveals the need for distinctively non-ideal epistemic norms. I offer a characterization of one such norm: the internalist practice of self-stewardship. (shrink)

How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It has five main goals. First, it (...) reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other ‘right-kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that irrationality can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Length of manuscript: 85,000 words. (shrink)

Harvey Siegel has argued that successful critical thinking requires both a critical mindset and expertise in evaluating reasons. In this article, I focus on the latter, the business of accurately appraising competing reasons in the practical domain. More specifically, I critically examine the limitations inherent in two commonly used epistemic frameworks: the balance account and reasons-for-and-against. I argue neither is suitable for scenarios requiring especially nuanced appraisals or complex metrics. This is because they primarily deal with somewhat crude approximations and/or (...) binary choices. I will propose a new framework to address this concern. I dub this the Stress-Testing-Critique-Support-Explanationist Account (STCSEA). STCSEA is engineered to handle complex practical epistemic situations, ones where determining what to do is not straightforward or immediately calculable. To fully understand the accurate and reliable determination of competing reasons’ strengths and weaknesses, educators require sophisticated tools. Such tools can help us fully to grasp the concept and mechanics of rational defeat—that being figuring out the strength of competing reasons. To do so, we must also formulate and continuously refine an operationalized defeasibility taxonomy.I proceed as follows. I begin by providing a brief overview of the critical thinking debate. I then survey John Pollock’s work on defeaters. This work is germane to the conversation yet remains something of a lacuna in the contemporary philosophy of education literature. After this, I discuss the balance account and reasons-for-and-against, specifically their evident limitations. I then make a case for the superiority of STCSEA when it comes to handling ‘hard cases’. These are cases where what we should, must, or may do necessitates a complex computation. Such computations often exceed the mathematical or epistemic resources associated with ‘balancing metaphors’ and ‘for and against’ determinations. (shrink)