The earliest references to Darwin in China, which came by way of the network of Protestant missionaries, emerged in the early 1870s: the principle of general transformism and ideas about human origins were transmitted to the Chinese intellectual landscape. Only with the “evolutionary sensation” aroused by Yan Fu, in the mid-1890s, did Chinese readers begin to learn of Darwinian principles like the “struggle for existence” and “natural selection.” Translation of the Origin began much later, in 1902, and the initial effort (...) was misleading. In his translation of the first five chapters of the Origin, published before 1906, Ma Junwu used linguistic strategies to modify Darwin’s texts so as to reflect Yan’s progressive transformism. But in his 1920 translation of the book in its entirety, Ma redid his earlier work. The complete Chinese Origin did not generate a sensation in the biological community. Even so, the deliberate selection, absorption, and appropriation of Darwinian ideas by the Chinese over the next several decades assimilated the new evolution into their own cultural setting. The case of “Darwin in China” details a specific Chinese context that deepens our understanding of how audiences for new scientific theories can be actively involved in the processes of appropriation and universalizing, while also disseminating, modifying, and assimilating Darwinian ideas in local context. (shrink)

This paper presents a historical examination of the influence of the Darwinian metaphor 'the struggle for existence' on a variety of scientific theories which inform our current understanding of the prospects for sustainable development. The first part of the paper traces the use of the metaphor of struggle through two distinct avenues of thought relevant to the search for sustainable development. One of these avenues leads to the biophysical critique of conventional development popularised by 'ecological economists' such as Georgescu-Roegen and (...) Daly. This critique suggests that modern economic systems have gone astray by failing to respect the biological and physical limits to development and that they should be adapted to make them more like ecological systems. The other avenue leads to the modern insights of evolutionary psychology. These latter insights suggest that in certain key respects, the economic system (and actors within it) are already behaving more or less like an ecological system, driven as they are by evolutionary imperatives. Consequently, this second avenue appears to offer far bleaker prospects for achieving sustainable development than the first. However, the final part of the paper re-examines the historical roots of the metaphor itself, and suggests a number of ways in which a critical response to those historical roots might influence our understanding of the prospects for sustainable development. (shrink)

The article sums up a number of points made by the author concerning the response to Darwinism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and repeats the claim that a proper understanding of the theory's impact must take account of the extent to which what are now regarded as the key aspects of Darwin's thinking were evaded by his immediate followers. Potential challenges to this position are described and responded to.

Numerous authors have examined the influence of other thinkers on Darwin’s formulation of some of the key concepts of the theory of evolution. Amongst those, Alexander von Humboldt often stands out – a scholar who, following his intention to explain the interconnection of various parts of the natural system, seems to tackle the question of evolution but does not offer an explicit answer. In this article, I examine Humboldt’s thoughts on evolution and the origin of species and evaluate his contribution (...) to Darwin’s theory of evolution. First, I analyse and explicate the fundamental assumptions and goals of Humboldt theory, and compare them to Darwin. Moving forward, I highlight the similarity of their methods, and argue that Humboldt and Darwin conduct similar investigation of fossil record and geographical distribution of species. Finally, I show that Humboldt acknowledges essential elements of Darwin’s theory of evolution: evidence given by fossil records, struggle for survival and relation between natural environment and living organisms. Humboldt, however, concludes we cannot know the evolution of species. I explain this stance, and contend that theories of Humboldt and Darwin turn out to be more similar than they seem, yet their different conclusions regarding the evolution of species stem from different initial assumptions underlying their respective frameworks. (shrink)

This paper presents an alternative conceptual foundation for biological evolution. First the causal and statistical perspectives on evolutionary fitness are analyzed, finding them to implicitly depend on each other, and hence cannot be individually fundamental. It is argued that this is an instance of a relativistic perspective over evolutionary phenomena. New accounts of fitness, the struggle for life, and Natural Selection are developed under this interpretation. This biological relativism is unique in that it draws from General Relativity in physics, unlike (...) previous theories that drew upon statistical mechanics or Newtonian dynamics. A mathematical law of evolutionary change, as well as new theoretical biological concepts to underpin it, are likewise developed. The law and theory are then applied to give examples of how both cornerstones and edge cases can be understood using these new methods. Using General Relativistic Biology provides fresh insight into evolution, all while preserving the core, canonical scientific research program. (shrink)

The paper characterizes Darwin's theory, providing a synthesis of recent historical investigations in this area. Darwin's reading of Malthus led him to appreciate the importance of population pressures, and subsequently of natural selection, with the help of the wedge metaphor. But, in itself, natural selection did not furnish an adequate account of the origin of species, for which a principle of divergence was needed. Initially, Darwin attributed this to geographical isolation, but later, following his work on barnacles which underscored the (...) significance of variation, and arising from his work on botanical arithmetic, he supposed that diversity allowed more places to be occupied in a given region. So isolation was not regarded as essential. Large regions with intense competition, and with ample variation spread by blending, would facilitate speciation. The notion of place was different from niche, and it is questioned whether Darwin's views on ecology were as modern as is commonly supposed. Two notions of struggle are found in Darwin's theory; and three notions of variation. Criticisms of his theory led him to emphasize the importance of variation over a range of forms. Hence the theory was populational rather than typological. The theory required a Lamarckian notion of inheritable changes initiated by the environment as a source of variation. Also, Darwin deployed a use/habit theory; and the notion of sexual selection. Selection normally acted at the level of the individual, though kin selection was possible. Group selection was hinted at for man. Darwin's thinking (and also the exposition of his theory) was generally guided by the domestic-organism analogy, which satisfied his methodological requirement of a vera causa principle. (shrink)

A number of areas of biology raise questions about what is of value in the natural environment and how we ought to behave towards it: conservation biology, environmental science, and ecology, to name a few. Based on my experience teaching students from these and similar majors, I argue that the field of environmental ethics has much to teach these students. They come to me with pent-up questions and a feeling that more is needed to fully engage in their subjects, and (...) I believe some exposure to environmental ethics can help focus their interests and goals. I identify three primary areas in which environmental ethics can con- tribute to their education. The first is an examination of who (or what) should be considered to be part of our moral community (i.e., the community to whom we owe direct duties). Is it humans only? Or does it include all sentient life? Or all life? Or ecosystems considered holistically? Often, readings implicitly assume one or more of these answers; the goal is to make the student more sensitive to these implicit claims and to get them to think about the different reasons that support them. The second area, related to the first, is the application of the different answers concerning the extent of the ethical community to real environmental issues and problems. Students need to be aware of how the different answers concerning the moral community can imply conflicting answers for how we should act in certain cases and to think about ways to move toward conflict resolution. The third area in which environmental ethics can contribute is a more conceptual one, focusing on central concepts such as biodiversity, sustainability, species, and ecosystems. Exploring and evaluating various meanings of these terms will make students more reflective and thoughtful citizens and biologists, sensitive to the implications that different conceptual choices make. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In 1798, Thomas Robert Malthus’s infamous An Essay on the Principle of Population was published. The publication of the Essay is best remembered for Malthus’s principle – that population multiplies geometrically as opposed to subsistence increasing arithmetically. What is not well known, however, is that Malthus’s Essay also offered a sophisticated – and heterodox – theory of mind. Despite a recent revival in Malthusian scholarship, Malthus’s theory of mind has been largely forgotten. The present study attempts to address this (...) neglected area within the literature, by evaluating Malthus’s contribution to the naturalization of the soul. I first situate Malthus’s theory of mind within the Essay’s broader naturalization project, examining Malthus’s role as naturalist; his views on humans as animals; and the Essay’s cosmology. This is followed by an exploration of the making and reception of the Essay, illustrating how readers widely interpreted Malthus’s theory of mind as a theory of naturalization. Finally, I reconstruct Malthus’s naturalized system of mind, discussing the mechanisms and dynamics involved in the operation of a materialist mind. In sum, I argue for the centrality of Malthus’s Essay in the larger naturalization movement, specifically as it pertains to the soul. (shrink)