The article explores the connection between James's " radical empiricism " and Deleuze's " transcendental empiricism " with a particular focus on the concept of " pure experience. " It argues for the substantial nature of this connection in terms of both philosophical motivations and formal innovations. Both thinkers are motivated to construct " better " empiricisms that do not complacently accept conventional conceptual representations as exhaustive of the real. Moreover, radical empiricism develops a latent critique of representational models of (...) consciousness that is accomplished through a turn to events or processes as ontologically primary. These innovations are further developed by Deleuze in his treatment of the problem of individuation. Taken together, they help to specify the metaphysical reasons for the experimental pluralism that both James and Deleuze affirm, showing how these reasons are inextricable from the radical empiricist impulse to be maximally inclusive of modalities of real experience, including the felt, the vague, and the affective. Emphasizing the metaphysical dimensions of these alternative empiricisms brings into clearer focus the stakes of philosophical thought as part of the open-ended and ongoing relational processes by which the universe continues to unfold. (shrink)