This dissertation addresses the problem of how to evaluate and compare the theories that inform diverse approaches to psychotherapy. It is argued that the field needs a superordinate epistemology to provide legitimacy for its theories and for the clinical work that these theories guide. Such a superordinate epistemology would occupy a higher level of analysis than the theories it is used to evaluate. ;Using a constructivist framework, it is argued that much of the epistemological confusion currently characterizing clinical psychology can (...) be traced to a traditional failure to distinguish among levels of analysis when evaluating clinical psychology theories. It is demonstrated that evaluations of such theories often conflate theory and epistemology. ;The received view of a natural science epistemology and hermeneutics provide the usual terms in which epistemology is debated. These are found inadequate to fill the necessary role of superordinate epistemology. The received view is criticized, in part, for "bracketing" the domain of meaning, and hermeneutics is criticized, in part, for "bracketing" the domain of extra-linguistic reality. For these reasons, it is shown that neither of these approaches can be considered to be superordinate to clinical theories. ;Next, some preliminary theoretical groundwork for the development of a constructivist superordinate epistemology for clinical psychology is offered. The domain of clinical psychology is defined as the conjunction of the domains of meaning and reality. A constructivist reformulation of the role of empirical research and observational knowledge is outlined. A reconceptualization of clinical theories as narratives and "expert languages" is suggested as well. ;It is argued that theoretical propositions first should be evaluated according to whether they conform to observational knowledge about the unintentional constraints on human intentionality. Then theories should be evaluated according to the coherence of their accounts of the transactions between the domains of meaning and reality. The hermeneutic circle is suggested as a methodology for choosing among different interpretations in a given therapeutic encounter. ;Finally, some directions for future work are suggested. (shrink)

This article provides a critical analysis of the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology. It first outlines the details and results from 4 paradigmatic studies in psychology that situationists have heavily drawn upon in their critique of the Aristotelian conception of virtuous characteristics, including studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Darley and Batson (1973), Isen and Levin (1972), and Milgram (1963). It then presents 10 problems with the way situationists have used these studies to challenge Aristotelian moral psychology. After (...) challenging the situationists on these grounds, the article then proceeds to challenge the situationist presentation of the Aristotelian conception, showing that situationists have provided an oversimplified caricature of it that goes against the grain of much Aristotelian text. In evaluating the situationist challenge against the actual results from empirical research as well as primary Aristotelian text, it will be shown that the situationist debate has advanced both an extreme, untenable view about the nature of characteristics and situations, as well as an inaccurate presentation of the Aristotelian view. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has been challenged on empirical grounds by philosophical interpreters of situationist social psychology. Challenges are necessarily challenges to something or other, so it’s only possible to understand the situationist challenge to virtue ethics if we have an antecedent grasp on virtue ethics itself. To this end, I first identify the non-negotiable “hard core” of virtue ethics with the conjunction of nine claims, arguing that virtue ethics does make substantive empirical assumptions about human conduct. Next, I rearticulate the situationist (...) challenge in light of these nine claims. I then turn to a discussion of specifications of several responses typically made by defenders of virtue ethics against the situationist challenge, arguing that most of them either are unsound or give up one of the elements in the hard core. A few, however, survive this criticism, and so I conclude by suggesting ways in which the situationist challenge might be not so much resisted as co-opted. Situational influences can be used to help people simulate virtue, a phenomenon I call factitious virtue. (shrink)

Many states recognize a legal right to bodily integrity, understood as a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s body. Recently, some have called for the recognition of an analogous legal right to mental integrity: a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s mind. In this chapter, we describe and distinguish three different rationales for recognizing such a right. The first appeals to case-based intuitions to establish a distinctive duty not to interfere with others’ minds; the second holds that, if (...) we accept a legal right to bodily integrity, then we must, on pain of philosophical inconsistency, accept a case for an analogous right over the mind; and the third holds that recent technological developments create a need for a legal right to mental integrity. (shrink)

The situationist movement in social psychology has caused a considerable stir in philosophy. Much of this was prompted by the work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris. Both contended that familiar philosophical assumptions about the role of character in the explanation of action were not supported by experimental results. Most of the ensuing philosophical controversy has focused upon issues related to moral psychology and ethical theory. More recently, the influence of situationism has also given rise to questions regarding free will (...) and moral responsibility. There is cause for concern that a range of situationist findings are in tension with the reasons-responsiveness putatively required for free will and moral responsibility. We develop and defend a response to the alleged situationist threat to free will and moral responsibility that we call pessimistic realism. We conclude on an optimistic note, exploring the possibility of strengthening our agency in the face of situational influences. (shrink)

The present study examined a relational model of appraisal that specifies the situational and dispositional antecedents of appraised problem-focused coping potential, itself a hypothesised antecedent of the emotions of hope/challenge and resignation. The hypothesised relational antecedents of this appraisal were tested in a quasi-experiment in which individuals varying in self-perceived and objectively assessed math ability attempted to solve math problems on which difficulty was manipulated. Findings for the critical test problem largely conformed to predictions: Under difficult conditions, but not easy (...) ones, increasing math ability was generally associated with elevated appraisals of problem-focused coping potential, increased hope/challenge, reduced resignation, and increased likelihood of solving the problem. However, problem-focused coping potential, hope/challenge, and the likelihood of solving the problem were all lower, and resignation was higher, for the highest ability participants, than would be predicted from their ability levels. Comparable findings were not observed for appraisals of emotion-focused coping potential or its theoretically associated emotion of anxiety, providing evidence of discriminant validity for the examined model. The results of a mediational analysis supported the hypothesis that the effects of the quasi-experimental design on hope/challenge and resignation were mediated by their effects on appraised problem-focused coping potential, lending support to the proposition that appraisals play a causal role in emotion elicitation. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 36 The situationist movement in social psychology has caused a considerable stir in philosophy. Much of this was prompted by the work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris. Both contended that familiar philosophical assumptions about the role of character in the explanation of action were not supported by experimental results. Most of the ensuing philosophical controversy has focused upon issues related to moral psychology and ethical theory. More recently, the influence of situationism has also given rise (...) to questions regarding free will and moral responsibility. There is cause for concern that a range of situationist findings are in tension with the reasons-responsiveness putatively required for free will and moral responsibility. We develop and defend a response to the alleged situationist threat to free will and moral responsibility that we call pessimistic realism. We conclude on an optimistic note, exploring the possibility of strengthening our agency in the face of situational influences. (shrink)

This paper examines the dominant theoretical approaches in the field of women in management (WIM) that have been applied to explain women's limited ability to assume organizational positions of significant power. The propositions of traditional (gender-centered and organization structure perspectives) and a newer theoretical perspective (gender-organization-system approach) are discussed. It is proposed that the theories embraced by WIM researchers bias the factors they examine, the methodologies they employ, the statistical techniques they apply, the results they obtain and the conclusions they (...) reach. This is shown to be a particular problem with the gender-centered and organization structure perspectives and not the gender-organization-system approach. (shrink)

A conception of parental experience is proposed to enhance the move of the study of parenting into the interpersonal realm by describing parental subjectivity from the parent's point of view. Explanations are based on that which the parent can be accountable for, on parental dialogues with observers/clinicians about their dialogues with their infants. This conception of parental subjectivity is compared with other conceptions which define parental subjectivity as the mental apparatus of the parent and not as representing the evolving relation (...) of the parent with the infant, and with explanations which consider parental reports in terms of the parent's psychodynamics and cognitive abilities rather than in terms of the on-going dialogues between themselves and their infants. The paper introduces a typology of parental dialogues with observers/clinicians about their dialogues with their infants, within the context of the non-verbal nature of the infant's communication. The findings from empirical examinations of this typology are presented, and their implications for the proposal that the study of parental relations with their infants should consider the parent's accountability are discussed. (shrink)

Research on abusive supervision is imbalanced in two ways. First, with most research attention focused on the destructive consequences of abusive supervision, there has been relatively little work on subordinate-related predictors of perceptions of abusive supervision. Second, with most research on abusive supervision centered on its main effects and the moderating effects of supervisor-related factors, there is little understanding of how subordinate factors can moderate the main effects of perceptions of abusive supervision on workplace outcomes. The current study aims to (...) advance knowledge of the roles of subordinates in the formation of and reactions to perceptions of abusive supervision. Specifically, based on victim precipitation theory, the authors examined subordinates’ personality traits and self-reports of task performance as antecedents of perceptions of abusive supervision. The results show that subordinates high in neuroticism or low in conscientiousness had high levels of perceived abusive supervision partially through their self-reported deleterious job performance. In addition, the authors investigated the moderating effect of subordinates’ personality on the relationship between perceptions of abusive supervision and subordinates’ interpersonal deviance. Consistent with trait activation theory, subordinates low in both agreeableness and extraversion were more likely to engage in deviant behaviors in response to perceptions of abusive supervision than subordinates high in either or both agreeableness and extraversion. (shrink)