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The probabilistic import of illatives

George Bowles & Thomas E. Gilbert

Argumentation 7 (3):247-262 (1993)

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On Defining ‘Argument’.Jeffrey Goodman - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (4):589-602.details There is no concept more central to logic and critical thinking than the concept of an argument. I here address the definition of ‘argument’ in the logical sense of the term and defend the claim that many current proposals, once they are interpreted in a way that makes them sufficiently precise, are extensionally inadequate. Definitions found in some contemporary, prominent critical thinking textbooks will serve as a springboard. I claim that each may be interpreted in an absolutist way or a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Reasonable Doubt: A Note on Neutral Illatives and Arguments.G. C. Goddu - 1999 - Argumentation 13 (3):243-250.details George Bowles and Thomas Gilbert claim that illatives such as so, therefore, and hence convey the meaning that the premise confers upon the conclusion a probability greater than 1/2. This claim is false, for there are straightforward uses of these illatives that do not convey the meaning that the probability is greater than 1/2. In addition, because Bowles' and Gilbert's claim is false, a revision of their definition of argument is required. Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Critical Thinking by Alec Fisher.G. C. Goddu - 2002 - Informal Logic 22 (2).details Download Export citation Bookmark
The Asymmetry Thesis and the Diversity of "Invalid" Argument-Forms.George Bowles - 1999 - Informal Logic 19 (1).details According to the Asymmetry Thesis, whereas there are many kinds of argument-forms that make at least some of their instances valid, there is none that makes any of its instances invalid. To refute this thesis, a counterexample has been produced in the form of an argument-form whose premise-form's instances are all logically true and whose conclusion form's instances are all logically false. The purpose of this paper is to show that there are many more kinds of argument-forms that make some (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Affirming the consequent.George Bowles - 1996 - Argumentation 10 (4):429-444.details The thesis of this paper is that an argument's possessing the form of affirming the consequent does not suffice to make its premises at all favorably relevant to its conclusion. In support of this thesis I assume two premises and argue for a third. My two assumptions are these: (1) that an argument's possessing the form of affirming the consequent does not suffice to make its conclusion certain relative to its premises (this is widely, if not universally, acknowledged by writers (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Attributed Favourable Relevance and Argument Evaluation.Derek Allen - 1996 - Informal Logic 18 (2).details I criticize a case made by George Bowles for a certain theory pertaining to the evaluation of arguments on which the (degree of) attributed favourable relevance of an argument's premises to its conclusion is relevant to its evaluation, but nevertheless argue that such favourable relevance is indeed relevant to an argument's evaluation. Download Export citation Bookmark

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