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  1. How natural can ontology be?Sharon L. Crasnow - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):114-132.
    Arthur Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) is intended to provide an alternative to both realism and antirealism. I argue that the most plausible meaning of "natural" in NOA is "nonphilosophical," but that Fine comes to NOA through a particular conception of philosophy. I suggest that instead of a natural attitude we should adopt a philosophical attitude. This is one that is self-conscious, pragmatic, pluralistic, and sensitive to context. I conclude that when scientific realism and antirealism are viewed with a philosophical (...)
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  • Why the Realism Debate Matters for Science Policy: The Case of the Human Brain Project.Jamie Craig Owen Shaw - 2018 - Spontaneous Generations 9 (1):82-98.
    There has been a great deal of skepticism towards the value of the realism/anti-realism debate. More specifically, many have argued that plausible formulations of realism and anti-realism do not differ substantially in any way. In this paper, I argue against this trend by demonstrating how a hypothetical resolution of the debate, through deeper engagement with the historical record, has important implications for our criterion of theory pursuit and science policy. I do this by revisiting Arthur Fine’s ‘small handful’ argument for (...)
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  • Qual o argumento para a Atitude Ontológica Natural?Bruno Malavolta E. Silva - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):175-205.
    Arthur Fine presented the Natural Ontological Attitude as a third alternative between scientific realism and anti-realism by identifying a core position contained in both and rejecting any philosophical addition to this core. At first, Fine’s proposal was understood as offering a doxastic middle ground between believing in the truth of a theory and believing in its empirical adequacy. In this reading, NOA was widely disregarded after Alan Musgrave’s criticisms of it, which characterized Fine’s proposal as a form of realism. After (...)
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