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  1. Liberal Naturalism and Second-Personal Space: A Neo-Pragmatist Response to “The Natural Origins of Content”.David Macarthur - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):565-578.
    Reviewing the state of play in the attempt to naturalise content a quarter of a century after John Haugeland’s survey paper “The Intentionality All-Stars”, Dan Hutto and Glenda Satne propose a new naturalistic account of content that supposedly synthesizes what is best in the three failed programs of neo-Cartesianism, neo-Behaviourism and neo-Pragmatism. They propose to appeal to a Relaxed Naturalism, a non-reductive genealogical form of explanation and a primitive notion of contentless ur-intentionality. In this paper I argue that the authors’ (...)
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  • Normative Phenomenalism: On Robert Brandom's Practice‐Based Explanation of Meaning.Ronald Loeffler - 2005 - European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):32-69.
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  • Answerable to the world: Experience and practical intentionality in Brandom's and McDowell's "intramural" debate.Steven Hendley - 2010 - Theoria 76 (2):129-151.
    Robert Brandom and John McDowell pursue similar, yet strikingly different approaches to a shared problem: that of how we can be answerable to the world in our beliefs about it in the wake of Sellars' critique of the myth of the given. While McDowell attempts to rehabilitate the idea that experience is capable of providing justifications for our beliefs, Brandom constructs a sophisticated social-pragmatist account of the objectivity of our conceptual commitments in which experience is, as he says, not one (...)
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  • Habermas's moral cognitivism and the Frege-Geach challenge.James Gordon Finlayson - 2005 - European Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):319–344.
    This is a critical discussion of Habermas's conception of moral cognitivism. I explain how it fits in with his meta-ethical anti-realism. I place Habermas's Discourse Ethics in the broad field of analytic meta-ethics. I also look at the question of whether the Frege-Geach problem applies to Habermas's Discourse Ethics, and if so, how he should best reply.
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