Increasing geographical mobility and international travel augment the ease and speed by which infectious diseases can spread across large distances. It is therefore incumbent upon each state to ensure that immunisation programmes are effective and that herd immunity is achieved. Across Europe, a range of immunisation policies exist: compulsion, the offer of financial incentives to parents or healthcare professionals, social and professional pressure, or simply the dissemination of clear information and advice. Until recently, immunisation against particular communicable diseases was compulsory (...) in Italy. The Italian National Vaccination Plan paved the way for regions to suspend the sanctions associated with compulsory vaccinations for children when certain criteria are met—for example when immunisation coverage is high and when effective monitoring/surveillance systems are in place—and thus marked a milestone in the move from compulsory to voluntary immunisation. The forthcoming NVP for 2008–10 confirms the liberal approach to vaccination in Italy as it entrusts to the regions responsibility for the achievement and maintenance of herd immunity. This paper reviews the arguments for and against compulsory and voluntary immunisation in relation to the Italian NVP and in the context of the diverse immunisation policies that exist across Europe. It concludes with cautious support for the NVP and an associated shift from compulsory to voluntary immunisation in Italy, and draws similarities between issues concerning regional variation in immunisation policy in Italy and national variation in immunisation policy across Europe and beyond. (shrink)

Background Contemporary societies are rife with moral disagreement, resulting in recalcitrant disputes on matters of public policy. In the context of ongoing bioethical controversies, are uncompromising attitudes rooted in beliefs about the nature of moral truth?Methods To answer this question, we conducted both exploratory and confirmatory studies, with both a convenience and a nationally representative sample (total N = 1501), investigating the link between people’s beliefs about moral truth (their metaethics) and their beliefs about moral value (their normative ethics).Results Across (...) various bioethical issues (e.g., medically-assisted death, vaccine hesitancy, surrogacy, mandatory organ conscription, or genetically modified crops), consequentialist attitudes were associated with weaker beliefs in an objective moral truth. This association was not explained by domain-general reflectivity, theism, personality, normative uncertainty, or subjective knowledge.Conclusions We find a robust link between the way people characterize prescriptive disagreements and their sensibility to consequences. In addition, both societal consensus and personal conviction contribute to objectivist beliefs, but these effects appear to be asymmetric, i.e., stronger for opposition than for approval. (shrink)

Angesichts der Zunahme chronischer Erkrankungen erscheint es geboten, vermehrt auf Präventionsmaßnahmen zurückzugreifen, die den Einzelnen zu einer gesundheitsfördernden Lebensweise anhalten und exogene gesundheitsschädigende Einflüsse reduzieren. Dabei ergeben sich zwei ethische Problemkonstellationen: 1) Welche Einschränkungen der Entscheidungsautonomie des Einzelnen sind gerechtfertigt, um bestimmte Präventionsziele zu erreichen? 2) Welche Verantwortung kann und soll der Einzelne für seine Gesundheit tragen? Fünf ethische Anforderungen sind an jede Präventionsmaßnahme zu stellen: 1) nachgewiesene Wirksamkeit, 2) günstiges Kosten-Nutzen-Profil, 3) akzeptables Kosten-Nutzen-Verhältnis, 4) möglichst geringe Restriktivität und 5) (...) faire Entscheidungsverfahren. Je nachdem, wie weit diese Anforderungen erfüllt sind, lässt sich eine unterschiedlich starke Beeinflussung der individuellen Entscheidungsautonomie rechtfertigen. Anstatt den Einzelnen für gesundheitsschädigendes Verhalten retrospektiv zu bestrafen, sollte er – im Sinne einer Stärkung der Gesundheitsmündigkeit – prospektiv in die Lage versetzt werden, Sorge für seine eigene Gesundheit zu tragen. (shrink)