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Introduction

Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland

In Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking: Philosophical Investigations Into the Character of Cognitive Experiences. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-24 (2015)

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Husserlian Horizons, Cognitive Affordances and Motivating Reasons for Action.Marta Jorba - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (5):1-22.details According to Husserl’s phenomenology, the intentional horizon is a general structure of experience. However, its characterisation beyond perceptual experience has not been explored yet. This paper aims, first, to fill this gap by arguing that there is a viable notion of cognitive horizon that presents features that are analogous to features of the perceptual horizon. Secondly, it proposes to characterise a specific structure of the cognitive horizon—that which presents possibilities for action—as a cognitive affordance. Cognitive affordances present cognitive elements as (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 8 citations
(1 other version)Exploring conceptual thinking and pure concepts from a first person perspective.Renatus Ziegler & Ulrich Weger - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2019 (5):947-972.details Traditionally, conceptual thinking is explored via philosophical analysis or psychological experimentation. We seek to complement these mainstream approaches with the perspective of a first person exploration into pure thinking. To begin with, pure thinking is defined as a process and differentiated from its content, the concepts itself. Pure thinking is an active process and not a series of associative thought-events; we participate in it, we immerse ourselves within its active performance. On the other hand, concepts are also of an experiential (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Kant’s and Husserl’s agentive and proprietary accounts of cognitive phenomenology.Julia Jansen - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):161-172.details In this paper, I draw from Kantian and Husserlian reflections on the self-awareness of thinking for a contribution to the cognitive phenomenology debate. In particular, I draw from Kant’s conceptions of inner sense and apperception, and from Husserl’s notions of lived experience and self-awareness for an inquiry into the nature of our awareness of our own cognitive activity. With particular consideration of activities of attention, I develop what I take to be Kant’s and Husserl’s “agentive” and “proprietary” accounts. These, I (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
(1 other version)Exploring conceptual thinking and pure concepts from a first person perspective.Renatus Ziegler & Ulrich Weger - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):947-972.details Traditionally, conceptual thinking is explored via philosophical analysis or psychological experimentation. We seek to complement these mainstream approaches with the perspective of a first person exploration into pure thinking. To begin with, pure thinking is defined as a process and differentiated from its content, the concepts itself. Pure thinking is an active process and not a series of associative thought-events; we participate in it, we immerse ourselves within its active performance. On the other hand, concepts are also of an experiential (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The science veil over tort law policy: How should scientific evidence be utilized in toxic tort law? [REVIEW]Carl F. Cranor - 2005 - Law and Philosophy 24 (2):139 - 210.details Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations

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