Gender dysphoria is a clinically significant incongruence between expressed gender and assigned gender, with rapidly growing prevalence among children. The UK High Court recently conducted a judicial review regarding the service provision at a youth-focussed gender identity clinic in Tavistock. The high court adjudged it ‘highly unlikely’ that under-13s, and ‘doubtful’ that 14–15 years old, can be competent to consent to puberty blocker therapy for GD. They based their reasoning on the limited evidence regarding efficacy, the likelihood of progressing to (...) cross-sex hormone therapy and the ‘life-changing consequences’ of puberty blockers. In this article, I offer two concurrent arguments to dispute their reasoning. First, I argue that minors can be competent to consent to puberty blockers for GD, because the decision to undergo puberty blocker therapy is no more complex or far-reaching than other medical decisions that we accept a child should be able to make. Second, I argue that—irrespective of competence—such legal restriction for all children fundamentally contradicts the central ethical tenet of child healthcare: best interests. For these two reasons, the high court should not restrict access to puberty blockers for competent GD children. (shrink)

Developmentally, adolescence sits in transition between childhood and adulthood. Involving adolescents in their medical decision-making prompts important and complex ethical questions. Originating in the UK, the concept of Gillick competence is a dominant framework for navigating adolescent medical decision-making from legal, ethical and clinical perspectives and is commonly treated as comprehensive. In this paper, we argue that its utility is far more limited, and hence over-reliance on Gillick risks undermining rather than promoting ethically appropriate adolescent involvement. We demonstrate that Gillick (...) only provides guidance in the limited range of cases where legal decisional authority needs to be clarified. The range of cases where use of Gillick actually promotes adolescent involvement is narrower still, because several features must be present for Gillick to be enacted. Each of these features can, and do, act as barriers to adolescent involvement. Within these limited situations, we argue that Gillick is not specific or strong enough and is reliant on ethically contestable principles. Moreover, in most situations in adolescent healthcare, Gillick is silent on the ethical questions around involving adolescents. This is because it focuses on decisional authority—having the final say in decision-making—which is one small subset of the many ways adolescents could be involved in decision-making. The implication of our analysis is that use of Gillick competence tends to limit or undermine adolescent involvement opportunities. We propose that those working with adolescents should be judicious in seeking Gillick’s guidance, instead drawing on and developing alternative frameworks that provide a comprehensive model for adolescent involvement. (shrink)

This paper briefly reviews highlights from decades of debates in medicine, law, bioethics, psychology and social research about children’s and parents’ views and consent to medical treatment and research. There appears to have been a rise and later a fall in respect for children’s views, illustrated among many examples by a recent book on the zone of parental discretion, which is reviewed. A return to greater respect for children’s views and consent is advocated.

Despite its invasive nature, specific consent for general anaesthesia is rarely sought—rather consent processes for associated procedures include explanation of risk/benefits. In adult intensive care, because no one can consent to treatments provided to incapacitated adults, standardised consent processes have not developed. In paediatric intensive care, despite the ready availability of those who can provide consent, no tradition of seeking it exists, arguably due to the specialty’s evolution from anaesthesia and adult intensive care. With the current Montgomery-related focus on consent, (...) this seems untenable. We undertook a qualitative study in a specialist children’s hospital colocated paediatric/neonatal intensive care (same medical team) in which parental acceptance of admission and entailed procedures is considered implied by virtue of that admission. Semistructured interviews were carried out with both staff and parents to investigate their views about consent, the current system and a proposedblanket consent system, in which parents actively consent at admission to routine procedures. Divergent views emerged: staff were worried that requiring consent at admission might prove a further emotional burden, whereas parents found providing consent a way of coping, feeling empowered and maintaining control. Inconsistencies were found in the way consent is obtained for your routine procedures. Practice does seem inconsistent with contemporary consent standards for medical intervention. Our findings support the introduction of a blanket consent system at admission together with ongoing bedside dialogue to ensure continuing consent. Both parents and staff expressed concern about avoiding possible harmful delays to children due to parental emotional overload and language difficulties. (shrink)