In this paper I ask how educational researchers can believe the subjective perceptions of qualitative participant-observers given the concern for objectivity and generalisability of experimental research in the behavioural and social sciences. I critique the most common answer to this question within the educational research community, which posits the existence of two (or more) equally legitimate epistemological paradigms—positivism and constructivism—and offer an alternative that places a priority in educational research on understanding the purposes and meanings humans attribute to educational practices. (...) Only within the context of what I call a transcendent view from somewhere—higher ideals that govern human activities—can we make sense of quantitative as well as qualitative research findings. (shrink)

In education issues to do with insider and outsider understanding arise in debates about religious education and about certain areas of research, and in argument about education for international understanding. Here I challenge the dichotomy between insider and outsider, arguing that a more collectivist view of human identity combined with elements of 'the self which we share with our fellows' means that we always stand in part as an insider and in part as an outsider in relation to others. I (...) argue further that 'understanding' needs always to be thought of in the plural, as a matter of 'understanding s ', since members of any community, and even any one individual, have different understandings at different times. Against what may seem the strong case in favour of the superiority or exclusivity of insider understanding, I note the force of claims in a variety of theoretical traditions (expressed notably in the Marxist tradition in the notion of 'false consciousness' and in psychoanalytic attention to the unconscious) concerning the limitations of the exclusively insider perspective and in contrast the particular authority of the outsider perspective. Finally, I acknowledge the discomfort with which people respond to outsiders' claims to understand them, especially where such understanding fails to support their own self-understanding, and identify ethical considerations, which might shape sensitive negotiation between insider and outsider perspectives. (shrink)

This article is centrally concerned with the sort of knowledge that can and should inform educational policy—and it treats this as an epistemological question. It distinguishes this question from the more extensively explored question of what sort of knowledge in what form policy-makers do in fact commonly take into account. The article examines the logical and rhetorical character of policy and the components of policy decisions and argues that policy demands a much wider range of information than research typically provides. (...) Either the research task or commission has to be substantially extended or the gap will be filled by information or thinking that is not derived from research. One of the gaps between research of an empirical kind and policy is the normative gap. In the final section the article points to the inescapably normative character of educational policy. Of course the values that inform policy can be investigated empirically, but this kind of enquiry cannot tell us what we should do. There is a role for research/scholarship and more rather than less intelligent and critical argumentation in addressing these normative questions as well as the empirical questions that underpin policy. (shrink)

This paper is a reflective account of the experience of designing and teaching a philosophy module as part of a research training programme for students studying for research degrees in education. In the course of the discussion, I address various problems and questions to do with the relationship between philosophy and educational research, the nature of philosophy of education and the role of the foundational disciplines in educational research.

There are marked similarities between Confucian ideas about the relationship between action, knowledge and learning, and contemporary educational thinking about action research. Examples can be seen in the relationship between action and research. First, Confucius emphasized the importance of ‘action’ which was different from ‘research’. The Confucian view of action implies that one should engage in a research process of deliberation in advance and then decide whether to take action or not. This kind of researched action is refined by the (...) process of deliberation which could be called ‘research pre action’—the first stage of action research. Second, Confucius emphasized the importance of knowledge, and this reveals that Confucius emphasized the importance of knowledgeable action. This view of the relationship between knowledge and action inspires an insight into the relationship between knowledge, action, and action research. This competence to research and acquire new understanding in action could be called ‘research in action’—the second stage of action research. Third, Confucius emphasized the importance of learning to connect the relationship between knowledge and action. According to Confucius, learning is an important medium to accumulate knowledge, enable action, and improve the relationship between knowledge and action. And it might enable the possibility of a set of relations in which ‘action’ and ‘research’ might no longer be segregated in their traditional dichotomy. This relationship could be called ‘research on action’ in the third stage of action research. These observations of the Confucian view show a new direction in action research. (shrink)

Traditionally, philosophical inquiry into pedagogical issues has occurred far from the classrooms in which pedagogy materialises. However, an organised form of inquiry into issues of a normative nature and of an analytic nature, making use of ideas obtained in an empirical way in classroom and classroom-related situations, is both feasible and desirable. About desirability, this form of inquiry depends on the particularities of the local situations, and that helps to take them into account when deciding on how to improve pedagogical (...) practice. That is, it contextualises pedagogical decisions. About feasibility for normative issues, an analysis based on Donald Davidson’s philosophy of language shows that there is nothing that compels empirical observations to be descriptive and to not be normative. And normative occasional beliefs acquired empirically can serve as a general confrontation or testing field for ideas about the justification of pedagogical actions or strategies. About feasibility for analytic issues, as a consequence of giving up the analytic–synthetic distinction it is argued that they can also be explored by means of occasional beliefs acquired empirically, when confronted with the implications of the definition of any pedagogical concept. (shrink)

The overall question addressed in this article is,‘What kind of philosophy of education is relevant to educational policy makers?’ The article focuses on the following four themes: The meanings attached to the term philosophy by philosophers themselves; the meanings attached to the term philosophy by policy makers; the difference place and time makes to these meanings; how these different meanings affect the possibility of philosophy influencing policy.The question is addressed using philosophical methods and empirical evidence from conversations and conversational interviews (...) with some philosophers of education and other educational researchers.The argument begins with an investigation of different ways of understanding philosophy and philosophy of education in relation to education and educational policy. It then examines first the current policy context and secondly some evidence about the practices of policy makers in relation to ideas and to research. It goes on to present some of the findings from the conversational evidence.The article is drawn together in the penultimate section where I make some suggestions about possible fruitful relationships between doing philosophy and policy making. Finally, in the concluding section, some further—thorny—questions are raised by the analysis, especially in relationship to ethics and social justice. (shrink)

This paper starts from the point in the early 1970s at which educational theory and research was temporarily structured under the ‘foundation’ disciplines of psychology, sociology, philosophy and history of education. It observes the way the intellectual resources of educational research have become enlarged and enriched and these disciplines themselves fragmented and hybridised to a degree that prompts talk not just of interdisciplinarity but of ‘postdisciplinarity’. The paper argues, however, that without discipline, in the sense of a shared language, a (...) rule governed structure of enquiry—something ‘systematic’—we lose the conditions that make a community of arguers possible. Further, we lose the basis for the special claim which research might otherwise make on our attention and on our belief. (shrink)

In this article the extent to which stories and personal narratives can and should be used to inform education policy is examined. A range of studies describable as story or personal narrative is investigated. They include life-studies, life-writing, life history, narrative analysis, and the representation of lives. We use 'auto/biography' as a convenient way of grouping this range under one term. It points to the many and varied ways that accounts of self interrelate and intertwine with accounts of others. That (...) is, auto/biography illuminates the social context of individual lives. At the same time it allows room for unique, personal stories to be told. We do not explicitly discuss all the different forms of auto/biography. Rather, we investigate the epistemology underlying the personal story in the context of social action. We discuss the circumstances in which a story may validly be used by educational policy makers and give some examples of how they have done so in the past. (shrink)

The viability of philosophy of education as a distinct and valued field of inquiry in educational research is under significant threat. While the debate over the proper role and value of philosophy of education continues, courses and faculty positions in philosophy of education become increasingly rare. I advance the view that this situation requires philosophers of education find new ways to bring their work to practicing educators. I propose a particular kind of normative analysis, within the context of moral education, (...) as one way to bring valuable philosophic work to the daily practice of teaching. It is argued that the use of normative criteria, comprised of certain key characteristics for moral education, can serve not only as valuable analytic tools but may also draw practicing educators into conversations that generally take place between philosophers of education in the academy. (shrink)

My central claim is that texts introducing and explaining critical realism focus on its ontological insights, and even though issues of judgemental rationality and theory choice are central to research these often become peripheral and/or are not stated in the way Bhaskar presented them. This claim is defended by comparing Bhaskar's statements and arguments about theory choice to texts introducing critical realism and its potential research implications. The method of rational theory choice and the key criterion for it are presented: (...) immanent critique combined with retroduction to determine whether a theory has greater explanatory power than its rivals, where greater explanatory power is defined as having greater epistemic credibility because it can explain more significant phenomena and has a greater ability to integrate knowledge; and multitheoretic-linguality as a prerequisite for applying the criterion of greater explanatory power. Greater explanatory power may be assigned to competing theories, metatheories and interpretations. Lastly, a more detailed example of the disparity between Bhaskar's specifications for rational theory choice and those found in a methodology text is provided. (shrink)