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  1. The No Probabilities For Acts-Principle.Marion Ledwig - 2005 - Synthese 144 (2):171-180.
    One can interpret the No Probabilities for Acts-Principle, namely that any adequate quantitative decision model must in no way contain subjective probabilities for actions in two ways: it can either refer to actions that are performable now and extend into the future or it can refer to actions that are not performable now, but will be in the future. In this paper, I will show that the former is the better interpretation of the principle.
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  • Truth Evaluability in Radical Interpretation Theory.Eleni Manolakaki - 2000 - Dissertation, Philosophy
    The central problem of the dissertation concerns the possibility of a distinction between truth-evaluable and non-truth-evaluable utterances of a natural language. The class of truth-evaluable utterances includes assertions, con. ectures and other kinds of speech act susceptible of truth evaluation. The class of non-truth-evaluable utterances includes commands, exhortations, wishes i.e. utterances not evaluated as being true or false. The problem is placed in the context of radical interpretation theory and it shown that it is a substantial problem of Davidson‘s early (...)
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  • What is rational about Nash equilibria?Mathias Risse - 2000 - Synthese 124 (3):361 - 384.
    Nash Equilibrium is a central concept ingame theory. It has been argued that playing NashEquilibrium strategies is rational advice for agentsinvolved in one-time strategic interactions capturedby non-cooperative game theory. This essaydiscusses arguments for that position: vonNeumann–Morgenstern's argument for their minimaxsolution, the argument from self-enforcingagreements, the argument from the absence ofprobabilities, the transparency-of-reasons argument,the argument from regret, and the argument fromcorrelated equilibrium. All of these argumentseither fail entirely or have a very limited scope.Whatever the use of Nash Equilibrium is, therefore,it is (...)
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  • Darwin meets the logic of decision: Correlation in evolutionary game theory.Brian Skyrms - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (4):503-528.
    The proper treatment of correlation in evolutionary game theory has unexpected connections with recent philosophical discussions of the theory of rational decision. The Logic of Decision (Jeffrey 1983) provides the correct framework for correlated evolutionary game theory and a variant of "ratifiability" is the appropriate generalization of "evolutionarily stable strategy". The resulting theory unifies the treatment of correlation due to kin, population viscosity, detection, signaling, reciprocal altruism, and behavior-dependent contexts. It is shown that (1) a strictly dominated strategy may be (...)
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  • Uncertainty, Rationality, and Agency.Wiebe van der Hoek - 2006 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    This volume concerns Rational Agents - humans, players in a game, software or institutions - which must decide the proper next action in an atmosphere of partial information and uncertainty. The book collects formal accounts of Uncertainty, Rationality and Agency, and also of their interaction. It will benefit researchers in artificial systems which must gather information, reason about it and then make a rational decision on which action to take.
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  • Social evolution and strategic thinking.Johannes Martens - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (5):697-715.
    Thinking about organisms as if they were rational agents which could choose their own phenotypic traits according to their fitness values is a common heuristic in the field of evolutionary theory. In a 1998 paper, however, Elliott Sober has emphasized several alleged shortcomings of this kind of analogical reasoning when applied to the analysis of social behaviors. According to him, the main flaw of this heuristic is that it proves to be a misleading tool when it is used for predicting (...)
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  • Chaos in game dynamics.Brian Skyrms - 1992 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (2):111-130.
    Two examples demonstrate the possibility of extremely complicated non-convergent behavior in evolutionary game dynamics. For the Taylor-Jonker flow, the stable orbits for three strategies were investigated by Zeeman. Chaos does not occur with three strategies. This papers presents numerical evidence that chaotic dynamics on a strange attractor does occur with four strategies. Thus phenomenon is closely related to known examples of complicated behavior in Lotka-Volterra ecological models.
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  • A note on the existence of ratifiable acts.Joseph Y. Halpern - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic 13 (3):503-508.
    Sufficient conditions are given under which ratifiable acts exist.
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