The present article aims to reconstruct some political consequences of aristippean philosophy in the light of fragment fs, 570 (= ssr, iv.a.163 = Memorabilia, ii.1.1–17) in order to show how Aristippus’ agreement with Socrates’ remarks fits the Cyrus composed by Xenophon in his Cyropaedia. In pursuance of this, I will review Aristippus’ ethics and will show how, despite the opposition with his hedonistic principles for a pleasureable life, Aristippus accepts that a good ruler needs to be a enkratic one—althouth he (...) argues that pursuing any rule is senselessness. After showing how it is possible to recognice some hedonistic position in Adeimantus’ question at the beginning of Republic, iv, I will present the enkratic character of Cyrus. Finally, I will conclude pointing out the political continuities between Aristippus’ acceptance in fs, 570 and the ideal of ruler constructed by Xenophon. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the claim that in Plato's Republic the most important distinguishing feature between the philosopher and non-philosopher is that the philosopher has knowledge while the non-philosopher has, at best, true opinion. This claim is, in fact, inconsistent with statements Plato makes in later books of the Republic. I submit that the important distinction Plato makes concerns the type of knowledge possessed by the philosopher-ruler. As a result, we need to amend widely held scholarly interpretations of (...) important passages in the Republic ; most notably the passages containing the Sun, Line, and Cave. I consider the views of a number of important scholars and suggest a proposal that avoids this inconsistency with the text. An important consequence of my argument is that Philosophers are indeed not the only ones with knowledge in the Kallipolis. (shrink)

Scholars have made several attempts to understand the ‘compulsion problem’ in the Republic, namely, why Plato compels the philosopher-rulers to descend into the cave to rule. These attempts, however, fail to properly incorporate two other main instances of compulsion in the dialogue into the discussion: first, the compulsion in Plato’s concept of philosophical rulership, which requires that one can be a ruler in Kallipolis if and only if one is a product of the coincidence of philosophy and politics; second, the (...) instances of compulsion in the future philosopher-rulers’ education. My main aim in this paper is to re-examine the ‘compulsion problem’. I argue that the just law that compels the philosopher-rulers to rule corroborates Plato’s concept of education to achieve the product of his concept of philosophical rulership, i.e. rulers who despise ruling. (shrink)