The classical theories of the genetic code claimed that its coding rules were determined by chemistry—either by stereochemical affinities or by metabolic reactions—but the experimental evidence has revealed a totally different reality: it has shown that any codon can be associated with any amino acid, thus proving that there is no necessary link between them. The rules of the genetic code, in other words, obey the laws of physics and chemistry but are not determined by them. They are arbitrary, or (...) conventional, rules. The result is that the genetic code is not a metaphorical entity, as implied by the classical theories, but a real code, because it is precisely the presence of arbitrary rules that divides a code from all other natural processes. In the past 20 years, furthermore, various independent discoveries have shown that many other organic codes exist in living systems, which means that the genetic code has not been an isolated case in the history of life. These experimental facts have one outstanding theoretical implication: they imply that in addition to the concept of information we must introduce in biology the concept of meaning, because we cannot have codes without meaning or meaning without codes. The problem is that at present we have two different theoretical frameworks for that purpose: one is Code Biology, where meaning is the result of coding, and the other is Peircean biosemiotics, where meaning is the result of interpretation. Recently, however, a third party has entered the scene, and it has been proposed that Robert Rosen’s relational biology can provide a bridge between Code Biology and Peircean biosemiotics. (shrink)

Life has semiotic nature; and as life forms differ in their complexity, functionality, and adaptability, we assume that forms of semiosis also vary accordingly. Here we propose a criterion to distinguish between the primitive kind of semiosis, which we call “protosemiosis” from the advanced kind of semiosis, or “eusemiosis”. In protosemiosis, agents associate signs directly with actions without considering objects, whereas in eusemiosis, agents associate signs with objects and only then possibly with actions. Protosemiosis started from the origin of life, (...) and eusemiosis started when evolving agents acquired the ability to track and classify objects. Eusemiosis is qualitatively different from protosemiosis because it can not be reduced to a small number of specific signaling pathways. Proto-signs can be classified into proto-icons that signal via single specific interaction, proto-indexes that combine several functions, and proto-symbols that are processed by a universal subagent equipped with a set of heritable adapters. Prefix “proto” is used here to characterize signs at the protosemiotic level. Although objects are not recognized by protosemiotic agents, they can be reliably reconstructed by human observers. In summary, protosemiosis is a primitive kind of semiosis that supports “know-how” without “know-what”. Without studying protosemiosis, the biosemiotics theory would be incomplete. (shrink)

This essay employs Charles Peirce’s triadic semiotics in order to develop a biosemiotic theory of life that is capable of illuminating the function of information in living systems. Specifically, I argue that the relationship between biological information structures , selecting environments, and the adapted bodily processes of living organisms is aptly modelled by the irreducibly triadic relationship between Peirce’s sign, object, and interpretant, respectively. In each instance of information-based semiosis, the information structure is a complex informational sign that represents the (...) informational object ; and the bodily, behavioral, mental, or intellectual processes that are organized by the informational sign to more or less accurately interpret the present environment constitute a complex informational interpretant—a living, interpreting organism. The essay begins by discussing the precise sense in which this biosemiotic theory is based upon Charles Peirce’s semiotic theory. Next, the theory is developed at length in relation to genetic information structures. Finally, I present a brief outline of how the theory applies to neural and linguistic information structures. The essay concludes with a reflection upon the anti-reductionist implications of the theory. (shrink)

This paper is divided into two parts. Part I focuses on the manner in which the components of the face recognition system work together so that a perceiver, within several hundred milliseconds after seeing a familiar face, is able to both identify the face of the perceived and recall elements of the history of past encounters with the perceived. Face recognition plays a crucial role in enabling both human and nonhuman primates to interact in collaborative social groups. This critical function (...) is accomplished through the unidirectional coded transfer of informational elements from one component to another. Although these informational elements themselves are not meaningful to the perceiving agent, they do nevertheless contain essential bits of information that are necessary for the final formation of the meaningful message. The structural components of the system are identified and the manner in which informational elements are coded and transferred sequentially from component to component in the brain of the perceiver is described. The independent, physically separated components in the face recognition system are bridged by an additional component, an “adaptor”, that mediates the transfer of informational elements from one component to another. The nature of the independent systems, and the manner by which the bridging or adaptor apparatus enables coded information transfer from one system to another is discussed. Part II focuses on the analysis of recognition in human-designed sign systems such as Braille and Morse code. Recognition in human-designed sign systems is notable for the stability of the link between sign and meaning. Face recognition is characterized as being subjective, indicating that the meaning of a sign to a perceiver is variable and dependent on context, whereas human-devised sign recognition is characterized as being objective, indicating that the meaning of a sign is context independent and invariant. Human-designed sign systems require the presence in brain of a referent world. An example of a referent world is the set of letters of the alphabet. Representations of this set are installed in the brain through social mediated learning. Human-designed sets of signs are created to correspond, via a code enabling adaptor structure, to referent worlds in the brain. Human-designed sign systems are the foundations for literacy, a capability only found in humans. (shrink)