ABSTRACT The academic defense of honor for its positive political and moral effects has surged recently among moral philosophers and political theorists. Challenging the narrative that the feudal legacy of honor has become outdated but acknowledging the reasonable points that opponents of honor have made, contemporary defenders aim to render honor compatible with society and politics today. This defense is reminiscent of that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially four modes of honor developed respectively by Hobbes, Mandeville, Montesquieu, and (...) Rousseau. Like contemporary scholars, these thinkers were conscious of the problems often associated with honor but appreciated its political usefulness. They aimed to preserve this feudal legacy in the early modern context. However, a comparative examination of these modes of honor reveals that, despite their internal coherence, they conflicted with one another owing to their authors’ conflicting understandings of the nature of honor. This conflict contributed to the tragic failure of the early modern defense of honor and testified to the conceptual elusiveness of honor. It is a cautionary tale for contemporary scholars who develop and defend essentialist and ahistorical understandings of honor. (shrink)