A speaker utters the grammatically correct phrase ‘x y’, and the hearer understands its meaning. The Naiyāyika claims that the only epistemic instrument that generates the semantic connection between the meaning of x and the meaning of y is testimony. This connection is essentially the phrase-meaning. The Vaiśeṣika wants inference to generate this connection. After presenting the Vaiśeṣika view on this topic, this paper will argue that, the hearer considers the generic categories of |x| and |y|, and infers their ontic (...) relation which finally will figure in the testimonial cognition. For example, when John tells Smith that ‘Jones smokes’, Smith first cognizes the meanings of the words, i.e., the individual called Jones and the activity of smoking. Then Smith infers that ‘John intends to say that the activity of smoking inheres in Jones, since an activity inheres in an individual.’ Thus, inherence which appears as the sematic connection is inferred in this case. If John is a reliable speaker, Smith will have a piece of testimonial knowledge. This is how the Vaiśeṣika’s inference could possibly support linguistic creativity. (shrink)

Recorded in Nirukta 1.15–16, the controversy between Kautsa and Yāska on whether the Vedic mantras are meaningful or not represents a turning point in the traditional interpretation of the Veda. While references to this controversy are often found in literature, a systematic discussion of the whole episode has not to our knowledge been undertaken. This paper offers a detailed analysis of this controversy. We first review previous scholarship and elucidate the structure and rationale of the controversy. Then, we provide an (...) annotated translation in which we propose new solutions to several philological and interpretive issues. (shrink)