In his Grundlagen, Frege held that geometrical truths.are synthetic a priori, and that they rest on intuition. From this it has been concluded that he thought, like Kant, that space and time are a priori intuitions and that physical objects are mere appearances. It is plausible that Frege always believed geometrical truths to be synthetic a priori; the virtual disappearance of the word ‘intuition’ from his writings from after 1885 until 1924 suggests, on the other hand, that he became dissatisfied (...) with the notion of intuition as he had employed it in Grundlagen. The belief that a priori intuition is a source of knowledge does not in itself entail idealism: that is a question about what it is that makes true the propositions known in this way. In Grundlagen, Frege expressly states that geometrical truths are objective in the sense of being independent of our intuition. This shows that, even at that period, Frege did not draw the idealist conclusion drawn by Kant. (shrink)