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Direct and indirect belief

Curtis Brown

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):289-316 (1992)

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Nominalism, Trivialism, Logicism.Agustín Rayo - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (1):nku013.details This paper extracts some of the main theses in the philosophy of mathematics from my book, The Construction of Logical Space. I show that there are important limits to the availability of nominalistic paraphrase functions for mathematical languages, and suggest a way around the problem by developing a method for specifying nominalistic contents without corresponding nominalistic paraphrases. Although much of the material in this paper is drawn from the book — and from an earlier paper — I hope the present (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 12 citations
Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs.Neil Feit - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29-55.details The author presents and defends a general view about belief, and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke's puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke's original (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
Narrow mental content.Curtis Brown - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details Narrow mental content is a kind of mental content that does not depend on an individual's environment. Narrow content contrasts with “broad” or “wide” content, which depends on features of the individual's environment as well as on features of the individual. It is controversial whether there is any such thing as narrow content. Assuming that there is, it is also controversial what sort of content it is, what its relation to ordinary or “broad” content is, and how it is determined (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 16 citations
Belief states and narrow content.Curtis Brown - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.details The first thesis is that beliefs play a role in explaining behavior. This is reasonably uncontroversial, though it has been controverted. Why did I raise my arm? Because I wanted to emphasize a point, and believed that I could do so by raising my arm. The belief that I could emphasize a point by raising my arm is central to the most natural explanation of my action. Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

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