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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Is the relativity of simultaneity a temporal illusion?
Analysis 73 (4):635-642 (2013)
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The aim of this paper is to describe and defend the moving spotlight theory of time. I characterise the moving spotlight theory as the conjunction of two theses: permanentism, the thesis that everything exists forever, and the A-theory, the thesis that there is an absolute, objective present time. I begin in Sect. 2 by clearing up some common misconceptions about the moving spotlight theory, focusing on the discussion of the theory in Sider. In doing so, I also fill-out the barebones (...) |
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According to metaphysical tensism, there is an objective, albeit ever changing, present moment corresponding to our phenomenal experiences :635–642, 2013). One of the principle objections to metaphysical tensism has been Einstein’s argument from special relativity, which says that given that the speed of light is constant, there is no absolute simultaneity defined in terms of observations of light rays . In a recent paper, Brogaard and Marlow :635–642, 2013) argue that this objection fails. We argue that Brogaard and Marlow’s argument (...) |
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In this journal, Brogaard and Marlow recently argued that the relativity of simultaneity is an illusion. We claim their argument is fallacious. |
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In a recent issue of this journal Berit Brogaard and Kristian Marlow claim that an absolute frame of reference is compatible with Einstein’s Special Relativity. To achieve this they tweak Einstein’s famous train and embankment thought experiment and unjustifiably attribute, to Einstein, Hans Reichenbach’s claim that cause and effect are always temporally separated. Their conclusion is incompatible with the proper Lorentz transformations to show how time dilates from one frame of reference to another; transformations they show no evidence of having (...) |
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The author proposes an analysis of boredom. The analysis he proposes is that boredom is an unpleasant mental state consisting of weariness, restlessness, and lack of interest, where certain causal relations exist among the components. He goes on to elaborate on and defend his analysis, concluding with some thoughts on the idea that boredom has some grand metaphysical significance. |
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It has been widely held that presentism cannot easily accommodate Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity account of the relativity of simultaneity because presentism privileges successively unique times ontologically. Recently Brogaard and Marlow argued that presentism does not deserve the attribution of this defect because it may well be that Einstein’s account of the relativity of simultaneity is defective, leaving it open to establishing a view of absolutist simultaneity friendlier to presentism. Specifically Brogaard and Marlow present an argument against one of (...) |
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