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  1. How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats.Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage - 1995 - Psychological Review 102 (4):684-704.
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  • Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel Goldstein - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (4):650-669.
    Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In contrast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with unlimited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following H. Simon's notion of satisficing, the authors have proposed a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: one-reason decision making. These fast and frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: They neither look up nor integrate all information. By computer simulation, the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Additive integration of information in multiple cue judgment: A division of labor hypothesis.P. Juslin, L. Karlsson & H. Olsson - 2008 - Cognition 106 (1):259-298.
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  • Memory‐Based Simple Heuristics as Attribute Substitution: Competitive Tests of Binary Choice Inference Models.Honda Hidehito, Matsuka Toshihiko & Ueda Kazuhiro - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S5):1093-1118.
    Some researchers on binary choice inference have argued that people make inferences based on simple heuristics, such as recognition, fluency, or familiarity. Others have argued that people make inferences based on available knowledge. To examine the boundary between heuristic and knowledge usage, we examine binary choice inference processes in terms of attribute substitution in heuristic use (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). In this framework, it is predicted that people will rely on heuristic or knowledge‐based inference depending on the subjective difficulty of (...)
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  • Judgment errors in naturalistic numerical estimation.Wanling Zou & Sudeep Bhatia - 2021 - Cognition 211 (C):104647.
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  • Familiarity‐Matching: An Ecologically Rational Heuristic for the Relationships‐Comparison Task.Masaru Shirasuna, Hidehito Honda, Toshihiko Matsuka & Kazuhiro Ueda - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (2):e12806.
    Previous studies have shown that people often use heuristics in making inferences and that subjective memory experiences, such as recognition or familiarity of objects, can be valid cues for inferences. So far, many researchers have used the binary choice task in which two objects are presented as alternatives (e.g., “Which city has the larger population, city A or city B?”). However, objects can be presented not only as alternatives but also in a question (e.g., “Which country is city X in, (...)
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  • The perception of dramatic risks: Biased media, but unbiased minds.Thorsten Pachur - 2024 - Cognition 246 (C):105736.
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  • The Earth is flat when personally significant experiences with the sphericity of the Earth are absent.Claus-Christian Carbon - 2010 - Cognition 116 (1):130-135.
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  • (1 other version)Information integration in multiple cue judgment: A division of labor hypothesis.Peter Juslin, Linnea Karlsson & Henrik Olsson - 2008 - Cognition 106 (1):259-298.
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