This paper scrutinizes the tension between individuals’ rights and paternalism. I will argue that no normative account that includes rights of individuals can justify hard paternalism since the infringement of a right can only be justified with the right or interest of another person, which is never the case in hard paternalism. Justifications of hard paternalistic actions generally include a deviation from the very idea of having rights. The paper first introduces Tom Beauchamp as the most famous contemporary hard paternalist (...) by outlining his moral theory (principlism) and showing why it, as it stands, has to allow for hard paternalism. Secondly, the paper focuses on the notion of rights within principlism. I will employ traditional theories of rights to make sense of rights in principlism. Unfortunately, this attempt fails. In the third part, then, I claim that rights can only be limited with reference to the rights or interests of others. This structure is the very point of rights, it is their bite. I will argue for this claim and show its implications. The most important implication is that not only principlism, but every normative theory that includes rights of individuals, has to abolish hard paternalism. (shrink)

It is widely believed that medically inert treatments (“placebos”) can bring about therapeutic benefits. There is also evidence that medically active treatments may also have “placebo” effects. Since anything that has the potential to benefit patients ought to be exploited, subject to appropriate ethical standards, it has been suggested that more should be done to investigate and exploit the power of the placebo for therapeutic benefit. I explore the acute epistemic and ethical constraints that such exploitation is likely to face, (...) and conclude that effective exploitation is unlikely. (shrink)

Kihlbom has recently argued that a system of seeking negatively informed consent might be preferable in some cases to the ubiquitous informed consent model. Although this theory is perhaps not powerful enough to supplant informed consent in most settings, it lends strength to Evans’ and Hungin’s proposal that it can be ethical to prescribe placebos rather than "active" drugs. This paper presents an argument for using negatively informed consent for the specific purpose of authorising the use of placebos in clinical (...) contexts. (shrink)

This paper attempts to define the concept of placebo as it is used in the clinical context The author claims that X is a placebo if and only if X has such a property dp, that whenever in a therapeutic situation T a stimulus S appears, then in attending conditions A, it will cause a beneficial reaction R in the patient. Formally, the same structure may be used to define any pharmacologically active drug. The main difference between the drug and (...) a placebo is in the range of possible substitutions for X and the property d. For the active drug there is only one possible substitution for X and property d and it can be scientifically explained why, and how the drug works. In the case of a placebo a set of possible substitutions for X and d is open, and so far it is impossible to offer any scientifically valid explanation of the action mechanism of placebo. (shrink)

In a recent article in this Journal, Shlomo Cohen and Haim Shapiro introduce the concept of “comparable placebo treatments” —placebo treatments with biological effects similar to the drugs they replace—and argue that doctors are not being deceptive when they prescribe or administer CPTs without revealing that they are placebos. We critique two of Cohen and Shapiro’s primary arguments. First, Cohen and Shapiro argue that offering undisclosed placebos is not lying to the patient, but rather is making a self-fulfilling prophecy—telling a (...) “lie” that, ideally, will become true. We argue that offering undisclosed placebos is not a “lie” but is a straightforward case of deceptively misleading the patient. Second, Cohen and Shapiro argue that offering undisclosed CPTs is not equivocation. We argue that it typically is equivocation or deception of another sort. If justifiable, undisclosed placebo use will have to be justified as a practice that is deceptive in most instances. (shrink)

A great variety of medical conditions are subject to the placebo effect. Although there is mounting evidence to suggest that the placebo effect is related to the expectation of clinical benefit, little is still known about the biochemical bases underlying placebo responses. Positron emission tomography studies have recently shown that the placebo effect in Parkinson’s disease, pain, and depression is related to the activation of the limbic circuitry. The observation that placebo administration induces the release of dopamine in the ventral (...) striatum of patients with Parkinson’s disease suggests a link between the placebo effect and reward mechanisms. In addition to Parkinson’s disease, the placebo-reward model may also apply to other disorders. However, the relative contribution of the different neurotransmitters and neuropeptides that are known to be involved in modulating the activity of the limbic system may be disease-specific. Thus, while the placebo-induced clinical benefit observed in Parkinson’s disease would mostly reflect the release of dopamine in the dorsal striatum, the activation of opioid and serotonin pathways could be particularly implicated in mediating placebo responses encountered in pain and depression, respectively. (shrink)

An argument is presented according to which exposing pseudo-scientific medical claims may be ethically wrong. It is then suggested that this argument gives an interesting explanation why the successful outing of pseudo-science may lead to an increase in medical pseudo-science overall.

A great variety of medical conditions are subject to the placebo effect. Although there is mounting evidence to suggest that the placebo effect is related to the expectation of clinical benefit, little is still known about the biochemical bases underlying placebo responses. Positron emission tomography studies have recently shown that the placebo effect in Parkinson’s disease, pain, and depression is related to the activation of the limbic circuitry. The observation that placebo administration induces the release of dopamine in the ventral (...) striatum of patients with Parkinson’s disease suggests a link between the placebo effect and reward mechanisms. In addition to Parkinson’s disease, the placebo-reward model may also apply to other disorders. However, the relative contribution of the different neurotransmitters and neuropeptides that are known to be involved in modulating the activity of the limbic system may be disease-specific. Thus, while the placebo-induced clinical benefit observed in Parkinson’s disease would mostly reflect the release of dopamine in the dorsal striatum, the activation of opioid and serotonin pathways could be particularly implicated in mediating placebo responses encountered in pain and depression, respectively. (shrink)

This paper attempts to define the concept of placebo as it is used in the clinical context The author claims that X is a placebo if and only if X has such a property dp, that whenever in a therapeutic situation T a stimulus S appears, then in attending conditions A, it will cause a beneficial reaction R in the patient. Formally, the same structure may be used to define any pharmacologically active drug. The main difference between the drug and (...) a placebo is in the range of possible substitutions for X and the property d. For the active drug there is only one possible substitution for X and property d and it can be scientifically explained why, and how the drug works. In the case of a placebo a set of possible substitutions for X and d is open, and so far it is impossible to offer any scientifically valid explanation of the action mechanism of placebo. (shrink)

In the field of placebo studies residual disagreement about the terminology ‘placebo’ and ‘placebo effect’ still persists. We differentiate between the conceptualization of placebos in clinical trials; and placebo effects understood as a psychobiological phenomenon. With respect to the latter, we argue that a scientific ‘placebo paradigm’ has emerged, indicating that—at least among placebo scientists—there exists relatively stable consensus about how to conceive of placebo effects. We claim that existence of a placebo paradigm does not protect concepts from revision; nonetheless, (...) we argue that scientific progress is dependent on, and guided by relative conceptual stability. Therefore, to mount persuasive arguments for conceptual revision in respect of ‘placebo effects’ we argue, critics either need to defend the claim that a placebo paradigm is not underway, or that there are major scientific failings in respect of it. With these considerations in mind we examine three alternative proposals for conceptual reform: Grünbaum/Howick’s relativity models of placebo concepts; Moerman/Brody’s meaning response; and Nunn/Turner’s proposal for conceptual eliminativism. We derive two conclusions from this evaluation. First, we conclude that no convincing arguments have so far been presented for conceptual overhaul of ‘placebo effects.’ Notwithstanding this analysis, we conclude that refinement of this concept is likely. Second, we agree with Turner and Nunn that the term ‘placebo’ in the context of randomized controlled trials remains a source of confusion for many researchers, risking the design and scientific integrity of clinical findings. Therefore, in these contexts, replacing the term ‘placebo’ with ‘control’ is justified. (shrink)

Power is an inescapable aspect of all socialrelationships, and inherently is neither goodnor evil. Doctors need power to fulfil theirprofessional obligations to multipleconstituencies including patients, thecommunity and themselves. Patients need powerto formulate their values, articulate andachieve health needs, and fulfil theirresponsibilities. However, both parties canuse or misuse power. The ethical effectivenessof a health system is maximised by empoweringdoctors and patients to develop `adult-adult'rather than `adult-child' relationships thatrespect and enable autonomy, accountability,fidelity and humanity. Even in adult-adultrelationships, conflicts and complexitiesarise. Lack of (...) concordance between doctors andpatients can encourage paternalism but may bebest resolved through negotiated care. Afurther area of conflict involves the `doubleagency' of doctors for both patients and thecommunity. Empowerment of all players is notalways possible but is most likely where eachparty considers and acknowledges power issues. (shrink)

In the present contribution, we argue that all health care professionals and particularly psychotherapists should provide a plausible rationale for their treatment including an etiological model and a model of unique and common change mechanisms. The provision of a plausible rationale has two goals: (1) meet the ethical challenge of informed consent, and (2) to improve treatment outcome by fostering the meaning response. In the course of the ethical and a legal obligation of psychotherapists to obtain patients’ informed consent before (...) initiating psychotherapy, patients have the right to receive maximally comprehensive information for providing their consent, which - among other information about the treatment (such as general psychotherapeutic approach, setting, and procedures) – should include a plausible treatment rationale. A useful concept in conceptualizing and communicating a treatment rationale as part of the informed consent procedure is Moerman’s general notion of the meaning response as the physiological or psychological effects of meaning in the course and treatment of an illness. The more compelling the rational explanation of the targeted treatment effects, the stronger the meaning response is expected to be. As the mechanisms of change in psychotherapy are known to be quite abstract and considered common to all approaches to a large extent, it seems especially important to provide a convincing treatment rationale to strengthen trust in the therapist and potentially foster positive expectations of process and outcome. To that extent, strengthening a patient`s meaning response to information provided at the beginning of psychotherapy may be central to activating common therapeutic factors. (shrink)