Academic freedom is thus a complex ideal, and I have argued that in many respects it has a more limited application than some of its protagonists seem to believe. Many of the arguments for it, moreover, are not peculiar to academics and universities. We would therefore be well advised to take seriously Eric James' injunction “to think less of universities as having rights to additional and peculiar liberties, and to regard them more as places where the essential liberties of a (...) civilised state find strongest champions, champions, moreover, who by reason of the intellectual strength which they possess, and the intellectual integrity which they defend, have a particular responsibility”.36 But it is beyond rational doubt that the continuation of civilised states as civilised depends on the maintenance of, among other things, academic freedom, and particularly of what I have called scholarly freedom. (shrink)

In his writings Jim Marshall has helpfully emphasized such Wittgensteinian themes as the multiplicity of language games, the deconstruction of ‘certainty,’ and the contexts of power that underlie discursive systems. Here we focus on another important legacy of Wittgenstein's thinking: his insistence that human activity is rule‐governed. This idea foregrounds looking carefully at the world of education and learning, as against the empirical search for new psychological or other facts. It reminds us that we need to consider, in Peter Winch's (...) words, ‘what it makes sense to say’ about certain educational phenomena, and how these meanings stand against understanding a wider form of life. This insight has important implications for doing educational research, and we examine some of these. (shrink)

In this article I describe the analytic approach adopted by Peters, his colleagues and followers of the ?London line? in the 1960s and 1970s and argue that, even in those times, other approaches to philosophy of education were being valued and practised. I show that Peters and his colleagues later became aware of the need for philosophy of education to become aware of and take in hand a new set of agendas and address the list of substantive issues inherent in (...) the contexts and political considerations beginning to impinge on education in the 1980s and beyond. I argue that there is much to be said for adopting a postempiricist problem-solving approach and point to the ways in which an evolutionary epistemology may be usefully applied to many of the problems of modern educational discourse. But I also seek to show how the abiding axiological concerns of Peters may still serve as the substantive background and definition of the value emphasis of the aims and directions in which philosophers of education are currently still working. (shrink)