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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Reid in context
In Terence Cuneo & René van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 31-52 (2004)
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In this essay, I provide a Baconian reading of Newtons Principia. I argue that Newton scientific practice was influenced by Bacons methodised idea of induction. My focus will be on Newtons argument of universal gravitation. |
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Francis Hutcheson's theory of perception, as put forth in his Synopsis of Metaphysics, bears a striking similarity to that of John Locke. In particular, Hutcheson and Locke both have at the centre of their theories the notion of ideas as representational entities acting as the direct objects of all of our perceptions. On first consideration, one might find this similarity wholly unremarkable, given the popularity of Locke's Essay. But the Essay was published in 1689 and the Synopsis in 1742, and (...) |
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O presente estudo tem o propósito de descrever e analisar um elemento da crítica de Thomas Reid ao ceticismo. Em boa medida, o cerne dessa é a sua crítica à “teoria geral das ideias”. Uma parte menos explorada dessa crítica, e que é o seu pano de fundo, é a concepção reidiana sobre o método de obtenção das verdades filosóficas. Aqui, um item central é a reflexão sobre a adoção de certas “regras do filosofar” de acordo com Reid. A relevância (...) |
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Describing the will and the extent of its causal power over human actions, Joseph Priestley famously compared the mind to a stone, as both are subject to deterministic laws: “Though an inclination... |
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Two significant aspects of Thomas Reid's thought seem to be irreconcilable with one another. On the one hand, Reid constantly refers to the substantive benefits which human knowledge receives from the Christian revelation. On the other hand, he does not justify philosophical or scientific beliefs by way of appeal to God. In this essay, I argue that a closer inspection of both Reid's philosophical reflection and scientific investigations shows that the two aspects just mentioned are compatible with one another. In (...) |
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