The institution of the family and its importance have recently received considerable attention from political theorists. Leading views maintain that the institution’s justification is grounded, at least in part, in the non-instrumental value of the parent-child relationship itself. Such views face the challenge of identifying a specific good in the parent-child relationship that can account for how adults acquire parental rights over a particular child—as opposed to general parental rights, which need not warrant a claim to parent one’s biological progeny. (...) I develop a view that meets this challenge. This Project View identifies the pursuit of a parental project as a distinctive non-instrumentally valuable good that provides a justification for the family and whose pursuit is necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of parental rights. This view grounds moral parenthood in a normative relation as opposed to a biological one, supports polyadic forms of parenting, and provides plausible guidance in cases of assisted reproduction. (shrink)

The institution of the family and its importance have recently received considerable attention from political theorists. Leading views maintain that the institution's justification is grounded, at least in part, in the non-instrumental value of the parent–child relationship itself. Such views face the challenge of identifying a specific good in the parent–child relationship that can account for how adults acquire parental rights over a particular child – as opposed to general parental rights, which need not warrant a claim to parent one's (...) biological progeny. I develop a view that meets this challenge. This Project View identifies the pursuit of a parental project as a distinctive non-instrumentally valuable good that provides a justification for the family and whose pursuit is necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of parental rights. This view grounds moral parenthood in a normative relation as opposed to a biological one, supports polyadic forms of parenting, and provides plausible guidance in cases of assisted reproduction. (shrink)

Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act justifies its non-commercialization approach to surrogacy on the grounds that commercial payments for surrogacy commodify women and are exploitative. However, empirical evidence suggests that payments in surrogacy are not exploitative, at least not to an extent that would warrant criminalizing payments. Given skepticism about the connection between exploitation and commodification, I explore whether commodification critiques can ground an alternative justification for the non-commercialization of surrogacy. First, I examine Vida Panitch’s argument that commodification critiques are flawed (...) for being absolutist, that is, they cannot identify what makes some surrogacy transactions better or worse than others. Second, I examine Anne Phillips’ rearticulation of a commodification critique: Commercial surrogacy is problematic because it undermines equality in a democratic society. I argue that Phillips’ revision can escape absolutism and provide a better justification for Canada’s non-commercialization stance. However, it also entails that the preference for criminalizing payments is weakened, as other policy solutions might be effectively implemented to protect equality. As a result, I propose a shift in how commodification is appealed to: Less attention should be paid to abstract values and more attention should be given to how those values are enacted relationally between members of a political community. I also tentatively suggest that commodification critiques might provide a normative basis in Canadian policy for a self-sufficiency regulatory framework, which centres on values such as solidarity and the public good. (shrink)