Philosophy lacks criteria to evaluate its philosophical theories. To fill this gap, this essay introduces nine criteria to compare worldviews, classified in three broad categories: objective criteria (objective consistency, scientificity, scope), subjective criteria (subjective consistency, personal utility, emotionality), and intersubjective criteria (intersubjective consistency, collective utility, narrativity). The essay first defines what a worldview is and exposes the heuristic used in the quest for criteria. After describing each criterion individually, it shows what happens when each of them is violated. From the (...) criteria, it derives assessment tests to compare and improve different worldviews. These include the is-ought, ought-act, and is-act first-order tests; the critical and dialectical second-order tests; the mixed-questions and first-second-order third-order tests; and the we-I, we-it, and it-I tests. The essay then applies these criteria and tests to a concrete example, comparing the Flying Spaghetti Monster deity with Intelligent Design. For another application, it draws more general fruitful suggestions for the dialogue between science and religion. (shrink)

In this philosophical paper, we explore computational and biological analogies to address the fine-tuning problem in cosmology. We first clarify what it means for physical constants or initial conditions to be fine-tuned. We review important distinctions such as the dimensionless and dimensional physical constants, and the classification of constants proposed by Lévy-Leblond. Then we explore how two great analogies, computational and biological, can give new insights into our problem. This paper includes a preliminary study to examine the two analogies. Importantly, (...) analogies are both useful and fundamental cognitive tools, but can also be misused or misinterpreted. The idea that our universe might be modelled as a computational entity is analysed, and we discuss the distinction between physical laws and initial conditions using algorithmic information theory. Smolin introduced the theory of "cosmological natural selection" with a biological analogy in mind. We examine an extension of. (shrink)

Management and organization studies (MOS) scholarship is at a crossroads. The grand challenges (such as the climate emergency) humankind must face today require an improved contribution from all knowledge fields. The number of academics who criticize the lack of influence and social impact of MOS has recently grown. The scientific field structure of MOS is based on its members’ accumulation of symbolic capital. This structure hinders speaking truth to the elite dominating neoliberal society. Our literature review suggested that a deeper (...) interaction between MOS and philosophy could aid in improving the social impact of MOS. Specifically, an attitude by MOS scholars based on parrhesia (παρρησíα, to speak truth to power) could revitalize the field through heterodox approaches and, consequently, allow them to utter sound criticisms of the capitalist system. Parrhesia would lead MOS scholars towards a convergence of ethics and politics. We investigate whether daring to speak inconvenient truths to the powerful (some peers in the field and some individuals and corporations in society) can be a straightforward tool for revitalizing MOS. Boosting a candid philosophy-MOS interaction requires the fulfilment of three objectives: practical dialogue between these fields, reconsideration of the fields’ structures based on symbolic capital, and a post-disciplinary approach to philosophy. That fulfilment implies the delimitation of the MOS-philosophy interaction, a respectful mutual framework, mutual curiosity, and moving from prescriptive theoretical reflection towards more socially useful MOS. Ethical betterment through parrhesia could be the key to surpassing MOS stagnation. (shrink)

En ces temps d’avenir perdu, les sociétés sont des sociétés spéculatives, qu’elles le veuillent ou non. Alors que la crise financière de 2007–2008 s’est transformée en une myriade de crises politiques dans les années qui ont suivies. En effet, l’esprit d’un âge néo-biedermeierien et les programmes politiques axés sur la stabilité sont devenus le modus operandi de l’Occident dans les contextes économiques et bien au-delà. Le désenchantement du néolibéralisme et son eschatologie politique dans un large éventail de domaines socioculturels perdurent (...) des deux côtés de l’Atlantique, tout autant que l’aporie des sociétés qui tentent de sauver le statu quo même si celui-ci avait perdu son chemin. En conséquence, les sociétés actuelles seraient, même sans le désirer, des sociétés spéculatives. Des éclaircissements sur la notion même de spéculation apparaissent alors nécessaires. Cet article vise à offrir ces éclaircissements. Pour cela, cet article s’appuie sur le cadre réglementaire d’après-crise de Bâle III. Cette analyse philosophique est d’autant plus éclairante si le « désarmement de la politique » (Habermas 2018, ma traduction) au nom de politiques prétendument inévitables, à vocation sécuritaire et stable, peut constituer l’objet de critique. Cet article est, par conséquent, une esquisse philosophique. Ce qui suit est une série de réflexions sur le concept de spéculation au-delà des frontières de la compréhension financière ou économique actuelle et, enfin, de minuscules manifestes sur la façon dont les études philosophiques et autres pourraient mobiliser et affiner ce concept. Tout d’abord cet article offre une histoire conceptuelle de la notion de spéculation (section deux). Dans un deuxième temps, les effets instables de l’aporie de stabilité concernant des régularisations financières sont analysés (section trois). Enfin, les bases pour un renouveau du concept de spéculation, utile pour la philosophie et qui maîtrise les apories des sociétés spéculatives, sont développées (section quatre). Si la philosophie ne peut prévenir la pensée d’être parfois large et incertaine, la philosophie peut sans doute être appréhendée comme un « hybride onto-épistémique-éthique », en recourant à la notion de spéculation. C’est ce que cet article suggère : offrir un langage qui pourrait permettre de penser la « spécularisation » des mondes sociaux en ce début du xxi e siècle. C’est à dire, le passage de la politique des classes à la politique identitaire (représentant les cultures plutôt que les classes), du capitalisme industriel à la politique culturelle (vendre des valeurs au détriment des fonctions) et des acteurs rationalisés au conservateur (choisir entre des identités à la place des préférences). (shrink)

My thesis situates itself within the field of the Philosophy of Worldviews. Specifically, it aims to address the normative question of what the task should be of such a philosophy when faced with the problem of conflicting beliefs between religious worldviews. To answer this question, I turn to the procedure of aporetical analysis, in short, aporetics. Firstly, aporetics offers a distinct method of consistency restoration within inconsistent sets on the basis of thesis rejection and thesis modification. Secondly, aporetics leads to (...) an understanding of the availability of aporetic exits on the basis of epistemic criteria. On the one hand, this leads us to opt for an orientational monism/pluralism, which steers the middle course between the epistemic stances of exclusivism and pluralism. On the other hand, it allows us to identify epistemic criteria for worldview acquisition on the basis of three distinct superclasses. These superclasses can be derived from Jürgen Habermas' validity claims, and applied to the self-understanding of contemporary theories of religion. (shrink)

The development of AI appears to be not only rendering humans obsolete, but in being empowered could decide that humans should be eliminated for the benefit of life and the conditions for its own future. Given the behaviour of humans, this could be seen as a relief to the rest of terrestrial life, as Günter Grass suggested in his novel, The Rat. While there are many reasons to support this contention, in this paper I argue that humans do have the (...) potential to augment rather than undermine terrestrial life, a potential celebrated by the subordinated tradition of the Radical Enlightenment. Rather than accepting the demise of humanity, it is now time to put the Radical Enlightenment into practice. (shrink)

One of the most influential recent developments in supposedly radical philosophy is ‘posthumanism’. This can be seen as the successor to ‘deconstructive postmodernism’. In each case, the claim of its proponents has been that cultures are oppressive by virtue of their elitism, and this elitism, fostered by the humanities, is being challenged. In each case, however, these philosophical ideas have served ruling elites by crippling opposition to their efforts to impose markets, concentrate wealth and power and treat everyone and everything (...) as mere instruments in a way that is not only undermining democracy and threatening economic, social and political stability through growing inequality, but is crippling efforts to deal with the global ecological crisis. Philosophers, Nietzsche claimed, are physicians of culture. Why should people claiming to be philosophers, or at least aligned with philosophers, subvert their own calling? In this paper I will suggest that with the expansion of education and the rise of neoliberalism, those involved in education and research, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, have been proletarianized, and most have accepted this proletarianization. They have been reduced to a fraction of the proletariat - wage-slaves without economic security and therefore dependent on the will of others on whom they are dependent. They are not ordinary wage-slaves, however, but wage-house-slaves, having salaries rather than wages. If, as Marx argued, social being determines consciousness, posthumanism can be understood as the expression of ressentiment of these house-slaves at their condition while simultaneously serving to affirm their superiority to field-slaves while serving their masters. Their work is supported because it provides ideological cover for their masters, the new transnational managerial class or corporatocracy as they expand their power through information technology, while absolving this corporatocracy from responsibility for the consequences of their growing power. In making this claim I will argue that the real target of deconstructionists and posthumanists, although this is now seldom appreciated, has been the humanism of the New Left, a revival of the Radical Enlightenment inspired by Renaissance civic humanism and the German Renaissance. (shrink)

Is there such a thing as a philosophical method? It seems that there are as many philosophical methods as there are philosophies. A method is any procedure employed to achieve a certain aim. So, before proposing a method, we have to tackle the delicate question: “what is the aim of philosophy?”. At the origin of philosophy, there is a questioning about the world. The worldview approach developed by Leo Apostel elegantly explicit those fundamental questions. As we answer them, we come (...) up with a worldview. Using this framework, this paper consider answering this enduring philosophical agenda as the primary aim of philosophy. We illustrate the approach by pointing out the limitations of both a strictly scientific worldview and a strictly religious worldview. We then argue that philosophical worldviews constitute a particular class of possible worldviews. With the help of three analogies, we give guidelines to construct such worldviews. The next step is to compare the relative strength of philosophical worldviews. Precise evaluation standards to compare and confront worldviews are proposed. Some problems for worldview diffusion are then expounded. We close with basic hypotheses to build a comprehensive philosophical worldview. (shrink)

The turn to analytic philosophy in Anglophone countries, which is still underway and is spreading elsewhere, has generally involved a retreat from ‘synoptic’ thinking and an almost complete withdrawal from ‘synthetic’ thinking, the creative thinking that in the past has been the source of the greatest contributions of philosophy to science, the humanities and civilization. Analytic philosophy’s ‘naturalistic turn’ led by Willard van Ormond Quine was really a capitulation of philosophy to mainstream reductionist science. So-called ‘continental philosophy’ when it abjures (...) naturalism, offers no real challenge to this. This paper attempts to recover a much more powerful challenge to such analytic philosophy and reductionist science, a philosophy which is naturalist but values synopsis and synthesis along with analysis: speculative naturalism. As such, this is presented as a manifesto not only for philosophy, but for science and the humanities. As Mikhail Epstein argued, the practical outcome of the humanities is the transformation of culture. To transform culture is to transform ourselves, our society and our relationship to each other and to nature. (shrink)