There has been a recent spate of publications on how we should evaluate change to ecological systems, some of which have introduced the concept of ‘relational values’. Environmental ethicists have, with a few exceptions, not engaged with this debate. We survey the literature on relational values, noting that most advocates of the concept introduce relational values as an additional type of value, in addition to ‘instrumental’ and ‘intrinsic’ values. In this paper, we explore the idea that all environmental values are (...) ultimately relational. We explore how such an approach can be articulated, and discuss the implications of this concept for the future of environmental ethics and value studies. One key implication is to suggest a stronger role for empirical ethnography. (shrink)

A global pandemic on the scale of Covid-19 upsets all standard decision protocols. Pressure from politicians to "open up" the economy presumes that individuals grant credible trust to politicians and merchants eager to recover customers. The asymmetric concern for safety compounds normal heuristics. The Peircean pragmatic maxim reminds us that it is the perceived effects of a post-pandemic society and economy that will drive human volition in the aftermath of Covid-19. Opening up does not equal showing up.

The overall objective of this dissertation is to study moral entrepreneurship within animal and business ethics in relation to moral change. In particular the current capability in bringing about moral change and its potential to do so.

it is a pleasant task to reflect on these thoughtful comments on my Coss lecture. Their gracious reception of an economist into the world of philosophy is an added bonus.Let me leave to one side—for the moment—the main title of my paper, and focus on the subtitle: “the collective construction of rules to live by.” Here, we find my core interest in both economics and philosophy. Beginning around the middle of the twentieth century, economists claimed to have the necessary tools (...) for deriving the optimal rules to live by. Once that claim was taken seriously by the profession, it became accepted practice for economists to become advocates for those decision rules. More correctly, economists became advocates for a.. (shrink)

Mainstream environmental ethics grew out of an approach to value that was rooted in a particular conception of rationality and rational choice. As weaknesses in this approach have become more evident, environmental philosophers have experimented with both virtue ethics and with pragmatism as alternative starting points for developing a more truly ecological orientation to environmental philosophy. However, it is possible to see both virtue ethics and pragmatism as emerging from older philosophical traditions that are here characterized as “agrarian.” Agrarian philosophy (...) stresses the role of nature, soil and climate in the formation of moral character as well as social and political institutions. As such, reaching back to the agrarian tradition may provide a way to move forward with both virtue oriented themes as well as pragmatist themes in developing ecological ethics. (shrink)

Theories of institutions can be classified into two broad approaches: institutions-as-rules and institutions-as-equilibria. According to the first approach, institutions are conceived as rules that guide the actions of individuals engaged in social interactions. On the other hand, the second approach views institutions as behavioral patterns. In order to have a complete picture of institutions, we need to take both approaches into consideration. Individuals construct mental models to produce expectations about institutions, while institutions make individual expectations relatively compatible. The main purpose (...) of this paper is to develop a general framework within which it is possible to analyze coevolution of individual mental models and institutions. (shrink)

Read Asad Zaman's paper 'The Methodology of Polanyi's Great Transformation'...

As an economist, I was raised on the milk of prescriptive consequentialism. The theoretical architecture of rational choice, welfare economics, and its applied version—benefit-cost analysis—was offered up as the definitive answer to a wide range of public policy problems. Welfare economics was alleged to offer value-free solutions to value-laden policy debates. Symbolic of this confidence is the claim by Milton Friedman:[C]urrently in the Western world, and especially in the United States, differences about economic policy among disinterested citizens derive predominantly from (...) different predictions about the economic consequences of taking action—differences that in principle can be eliminated by the progress of.. (shrink)

A commitment to receive input from stakeholders is often obligatory in the crafting of environmental policies. This requirement is presumed to satisfy certain conditions of democracy. The need for stakeholder input is quite intuitive; public decision makers want to know what their constituents—or at least a limited number of them—think about certain issues. At the same time, individuals, groups, communities, and various interest groups want to learn about the plans that authoritative agencies have concerning those things that affect their daily (...) lives. In light of this widespread commitment to stakeholder input, it is surprising that little attention has been paid to the necessary conditions under which .. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to develop a critical and extended understanding of creative practices in organisation from a phenomenological point of view. To develop such an understanding of practice, this paper will first outline a phenomenological understanding of creative practice, understood particularly with Merleau-Ponty as an embodied and situated nexus of action. Subsequently, the paper will show the contribution of pragmatism to an interpretation of practice as an experience-based reality and will describe the significance of habits. After briefly (...) comparing common characteristics of both pro-experiential philosophies, some perspectives on a creative "inter-practice" and an inclusive "pheno-pragma-practice" will be explored. Furthermore, improvisation is discussed as a form and medium for the actual realisation of an embodied, situational inter-practice. Finally, some practical, political, theoretical and methodological implications and perspectives on creative pheno-pragmatic practices in organisation will be outlined. (shrink)

Critics of my book, Sustainability, have raised many objections which are addressed. In general, I emphasize that the book is an integrative work; it must be long and complex beause it attempts a comprehensive treatment of problems of communication, of evaluation, and of management action in environmental discourse. I explain that I depend upon the pragmatists and on work in the pragmatics of language because the current language of environmental policy discourse is inadequate to allow deliberative processes that can reach (...) consensus and cooperative actions. I revise my account of risk analysis somewhat, and defend my broad approach to the concept of sustainability. Finally, I discuss applications of my book to the current situation in environmental policy discourse. (shrink)

Recent interest in the alleged rationality and fatalism of Russian peasants illustrates persistent tendencies to objectify certain social actors—and to assign normative labels to their vexing behavior. Sometimes those labels are demeaning. I call attention to this unpleasant tendency, and ask why some social actors attract our analytical interest, while other social actors escape such scrutiny. This disparity is particularly interesting when the two social actors are engaged in a setting where extractive power is present yet unnoticed.

The ethical principle of autonomy is among the most fundamental in ethics, and it is particularly salient for those in public health, who must constantly balance the desire to improve health outcomes by changing behavior with respect for individual freedom. Although there are some areas in which there is a genuine tension between public health and autonomy—childhood vaccine mandates, for example—there are many more areas where not only is there no tension, but public health and autonomy come down to the (...) same thing. These areas of overlap are often rendered invisible by a thin understanding of autonomy. Better integrating newer theoretical insights about autonomy into applied ethics can make discussions of public health ethics more rigorous, incisive, and effective. Even more importantly, bringing modern concepts of autonomy into public health ethics can showcase the many areas in which public health and autonomy have the same goals, face the same threats, and can be mutually advanced by the same kinds of solutions. This article provides a schema for relational autonomy in a public health context and gives concrete examples of how autonomy can be served through public-health interventions. It marshals insights from sociology, psychology, and philosophy to advance a theory of autonomy and coercion that recognizes three potential threats to autonomy: threats to choice sets, threats to knowledge, and threats to preferences. (shrink)

In a time imbued with civilisation crisis, José Manuel Naredo's work is of particular relevance. Naredo, one of the most prestigious economists in Spain and a pioneer of ecological economics, first published his most popular book ( La economía en evolución. Historia y perspectivas de las categorías básicas del pensamiento económico) in 1987. This article reviews its most recent and updated version released in 2015. Beyond a brilliant criticism of neoclassical economics, he discusses the underlying ideology and implications of the (...) notion of economic system uncritically endorsed by most schools of economic thought. Transcending the usual dichotomy between ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’ economics, Naredo calls for an economic transition built on the integration of different kinds of scientific knowledge as well as other intuitive, metaphysical and ethical fields in favour of a truly inclusive economics. This is, he warns us, a sine qua non for a socioecological transformation to flourish. (shrink)

Courts have determined that adaptive management does not satisfy the Endangered Species Act's requirement to use the ‘best available science’. This is due, in part, to the failure to recognise the role of non-epistemic values in science. We examine the role of values in the legal controversy over the scientific reports and adaptive management plans for endangered salmon in the Columbia River Basin. To do this, we employ philosophical concepts related to risk and uncertainty that demonstrate how non-epistemic values are (...) internal to science. We describe how, because adaptive management is a method for dealing with inductive risk, by remaining flexible, responsive and adaptive in those circumstances where the costs of making a mistake are very high, it requires special attention to ensure that it remains useful. We conclude that, because non-epistemic values will inevitably influence the ‘best available science’, it is critical that they are clarified in any adaptive management planning so that we can ensure the salmon conservation that the ESA mandates. Fortunately, because adaptive management is iterative in nature and includes opportunities for engagement between policymakers and scientists, it enables clarification of non-epistemic values through making standards of evidence transparent, acknowledging aims and goals and dealing with uncertainty at the institutional level. (shrink)