In this paper, I describe a sense of oneness that, while having its roots in a tradition of thought far removed from our own, might nonetheless be of relevance to persons today. It is not a oneness with all of humanity, let alone with all the creatures under the sky or all the elements of the cosmos. Nevertheless, it is a sense of oneness that transcends one’s own person and connects one to a larger whole. I will be calling this (...) conception that of a superorganism, to borrow a phrase the natural and social sciences. I reconstruct this sense of oneness by surveying conceptions of society in classical Confucian texts. I begin with passages from the > Analects> that can be interpreted as containing within them such a sense of oneness as superorganism. Later, I present what I take to be stronger evidence of a more explicit kind in the Daxue and Zhongyong chapters of the > Liji> . I then conclude by arguing that thinking of Confucian social and political philosophy in terms of a superorganism can be helpful in understanding why the entire project may have been ill founded. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, language is part of a social activity in both Wittgenstein and Xunzi 荀子, and for both clarification of language is central to their philosophical projects; the goal of this article is to explore the extent of resonance and discord that may be found when comparing these two philosophers. While for Xunzi, the rectification of names (zhengming 正名) is anchored in a regard for establishing, propagating, and/or restoring a harmonious social system, perspicuity is for Wittgenstein represented as a philosophical (...) end in itself. The article ventures study in particular the themes of perspicuity and aspect-perception in Wittgenstein together with the topics of correcting names and the cultivation of the heart-mind (xin 心) in the Xunzi. The aspiration of this project is to gain an overview of the role(s) of clarification projects in different philosophical traditions, all while not overlooking the different historical contexts and philosophical ends of these two philosophers. (shrink)

In the philosophy of Confucius, the concept _li_ is both central and elusive. While it is often translated 'ritual' or 'the rites,' I argue that there are numerous significant ways in which _li_ is as much an internal property of individuals as it is an external set of rules or norms. I discuss _li_ as deference, as developed dispositions, as embodied intelligence, and as personalized exemplary conduct. Finally, reflecting on the work of Fingarette, and Hall and Ames, as well as (...) Wilson's analysis of their work, I argue that the external _aspect_ of _li_, although reasonably understood under the rubric of 'traditional norms,' may nonetheless legitimately evolve, and that this coheres well with the notion that an internal sense-of-ritual is integral to the meaning of _li_. (shrink)

This essay is the first general study of the work of You Ruo or Youzi (fl. 470 B.C.E. ). It also defends his views and argues that he was an important independent figure in the origins of Confucianism. Youzi is thought to have been a disciple of Confucius, and his work is studied mainly for its insight into Confucius. Hence, his work is seriously misunderstood. In fact Youzi's main views were not shared by Confucius, and the evidence suggests that Youzi (...) did not study with Confucius. Youzi's surviving writings form a tightly coherent whole in style and substance. Together they sketch a powerful general vision of the psychology of the virtues and use it to generate parallel solutions to four basic moral dilemmas. Youzi's thought is highly plausible and directly relevant to current issues in moral theory and practice. (shrink)

The paper is an effort to better understand, through a comparison, how Confucius and Socrates initate their ethical inquiries that have laid down, respectively, the foundations of Chinese and Western ethics. Since both Confucius and Socrates claim to have a divine mission to undertake their investigations, the paper focuses on the issue about how religion and rational philosophy are related when ethics begins. It shows that both have serious religious belief, yet each has secular rational grounds for doing what he (...) is doing. Finally, each philosopher has a different view about how human beings are related to the divine being, and the difference determines their different approaches to ethics. (shrink)

Confucius reinvented the concept of Junzi （君子）, an idea of personhood which invites continual assessment whether the concerns people were once devoted to are worthy of ongoing devotion, and how they make a place in the world—a place where they hope they can exercise some governance in their lives. Junzi （君子）is a agent, and has the properties and powers to monitor their lives, and to contribute to societal transformation. Cultivating a person is centrally involved in the politics of subjectivity, in (...) forming and constituting the self because self always reflects the bounds and conventions of its history. The term Junzi （君子）is harnessed to make the individual a significant element for the state through the exercise of a form of power. So this kind of self-mastery incorporates notions of governmentality, freedom and the historical–social context to understandings of the self. So if we understand that the essence of civil society consists in agency-building self-transformation, there is ample evidence that Confucius was committed to reconstructing moral agency and civil society in a way that would be characteristically Confucian. Junzi (君子) is the case in point. (shrink)

This essay analyzes how the zhengming 正名 theory of Confucius is linked to the problem of “observances of form” in light of the methodology of Confucian aesthetics. This essay argues that the “name-shape” combination in the zhengming paradigm is ultimately connected with the “name-role” combination. The “name-shape” paradigm continuously maintains and strengthens the “name-role” paradigm. However, the “name-shape” paradigm itself ultimately becomes more meaningful than the “name-role” paradigm. This is because the aesthetic structure that appears peculiar in the Analects constitutes (...) the “name-shape” paradigm. In this aesthetic structure, what is ultimately important is “form.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT It has recently been argued that in Analects 17.21, Confucius advises a disciple to do something that he, Confucius, believes to be morally wrong. According to Frederick Choo, despite believing that it is morally wrong to not properly observe the three-year mourning ritual for a deceased parent, Confucius tells Zai Wo that he should do so. Choo offers two justifications for Confucius’s doing this. In this essay, I argue that the justifications Choo offers for Confucius’s advising Zai Wo to (...) do what he believes to be morally wrong are untenable. Indeed, I argue that Confucius does not, in fact, advise Zai Wo to do what he believes to be morally wrong. Instead, I argue that Confucius’s advice to Zai Wo in Analects 17.21 is best understood as an expression of exasperation and sarcasm. (shrink)