The Food and Drug Administration authorizes the marketing of a drug only for uses that the manufacturer has demonstrated to be safe and effective, based on evidence from at least two clinical trials. However, the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, so physicians may prescribe drugs in any manner they choose. Prescribing drugs in ways that deviate from the uses specified in the FDA-approved drug label, package insert, and marketing authorization is referred to as off-label prescribing. This occurs (...) when physicians prescribe a drug for a therapeutic purpose other than the one approved by the FDA; treat patients in a different age cohort or gender than the population on which it was tested; or prescribe a different dose, for a different duration of use, or a different mode of administration than indicated on the label. (shrink)

Today, the goals of pharmaceutical policy and medical practice are often undermined due to institutional corruption — that is, widespread or systemic practices, usually legal, that undermine an institution's objectives or integrity. In this symposium, 16 articles investigate the corruption of pharmaceutical policy, each taking a different look at the sources of corruption, how it occurs, and what is corrupted. We will see that the pharmaceutical industry's own purposes are often undermined. Furthermore, pharmaceutical industry funding of election campaigns and lobbying (...) skews the legislative process that sets pharmaceutical policy. Moreover, certain practices have corrupted medical research, the production of medical knowledge, the practice of medicine, drug safety, the Food and Drug Administration's oversight of the pharmaceutical market, and the trustworthiness of patient advocacy organizations. (shrink)

Improper dependencies slant policy over a drug's life span, biasing the development of new drugs, the testing and marketing approval for new drugs, and the monitoring of patient safety after drugs are marketed. This article examines five ways in which the public improperly depends on pharmaceutical firms that compromise the integrity of pharmaceutical policy. Today the public relies on pharmaceutical firms: (1) to set priorities on drug research and development; (2) to conduct clinical trials to test whether drugs are safe (...) and effective; (3) to decide what clinical trial data to disclose to the public; (4) to monitor post marketing drug safety; (5) to supply product information to physicians and to finance continuing medical education and other professional activities. The article suggests options to overcome each of these dependencies. (shrink)

The federal government indirectly subsidizes the pharmaceutical industry by funding basic research, various tax credits and deductions, patent rules, grants of market exclusivity, and other means, in order to spur drug development, promote public health, and improve medical care. But today, the pharmaceutical industry often neglects these goals and sometimes even undermines them, due to what Lawrence Lessig refers to as institutional corruption — that is, widespread or systemic practices, usually legal, that undermine an institution’s objectives or integrity. A key (...) source of institutional corruption is improper dependence by the institution or its key actors on the actions of third parties that have fundamentally different interests. It is the health care system’s improper dependency on pharmaceutical firms that allows them to displace some public policy goals and to compromise the attainment of others. (shrink)

This article explores whether the bioethical performance and trustworthiness of pharmaceutical companies can be improved by harnessing market forces through the use of accreditation, certification, or rating. Other industries have used such systems to define best practices, set standards, and assess and signal the quality of services, processes, and products. These systems have also informed decisions in other industries about where to invest, what to buy, where to work, and when to regulate. Similarly, accreditation, certification, and rating programs can help (...) drug companies address stakeholder concerns in four areas: clinical trial design and management, dissemination of clinical trial results, marketing practices, and the accessibility of medicines. To illuminate processes — such as conflicts of interests and revolving-door policies — that can jeopardize the integrity of accreditation, certification, and ratings systems, the article concludes with a consideration of recent failures of credit-rating agencies and a review of the regulatory capture literature. (shrink)

Could an accreditation, certification, or rating mechanism help the pharmaceutical industry improve both its bioethical performance and its public reputation? Other industries have used such systems to assess, improve, distinguish, and demonstrate the quality of their services, processes, and products. These systems have also helped increase transparency, accountability, stakeholder confidence, and awareness of industry best practices. This article explains how market forces can be harnessed to recognize and promote better bioethical performance by pharmaceutical companies when there are good systems to (...) accredit, certify, or rate. It concludes with a review of relevant failures of credit-rating agencies — such as conflicts of interests and revolving-door practices — to illuminate some of the pitfalls of developing a bioethics accreditation, certification, or rating system for pharmaceutical companies. (shrink)

To sell a new drug, pharmaceutical companies must discover a compound, run clinical trials to test its efficacy and safety, get it approved by regulatory bodies, produce the drug, and market it. As this process brings the drug through so many hands, there are risks of many kinds of corruption. The pharmaceutical industry has recently gone from being one of the most admired industries to being described by the majority of Americans as “dishonest, unethical, and more concerned with profits than (...) with individual and public health.” Legal scholar Marc Rodwin suggested that the pharmaceutical industry can be viewed through the lens of institutional corruption as defined by legal scholar Lawrence Lessig, whereby widespread or systemic practices undermine the main purposes of drug therapy — healing illness, preventing medical problems, and alleviating suffering. Many drugs do serve these goals, yet a significant number of drugs churned out by pharmaceutical companies are ineffective or have dangerous side effects that could have been predicted had the companies conducted the appropriate research. (shrink)

Two insights of psychology on which we would like to draw are that people react to law in more complex ways than rational-choice models assume and that good people sometimes do bad things. With that starting point, this article provides a behavioral perspective on some of the factors that policymakers seeking to reduce the level of misconduct in the pharmaceutical industry should consider. Effective regulation and enforcement need to address the following questions: Who are the regulation's targeted actors — researchers (...) or executives? Are the regulations directed toward research or marketing activities? Is the misconduct a product of explicit rational choice or implicit processes of which the actor is unaware? Is it reasonable to address all types of misconduct using the same approach? Certain misconduct — particularly by researchers — is due to automatic, intuitive, and unconscious decisions and needs to be addressed through different means than those used to address misconduct due to controlled, deliberate decisions. This article therefore recommends using different sorts of regulation depending on the context. It suggests more tailored enforcement mechanisms that will be sensitive to the pharmaceutical researchers’ unique work motivations and to their awareness or lack of awareness of their own misconduct. (shrink)