Revisionist just war scholarship employs the rigors of analytical philosophy to make arguments about the deep morality of war. Accepting the individual and cosmopolitan are paramount to making sense of war as many revisionists do, this essay looks outside the just war canon to Montaigne—a sixteenth century French humanist hailed for his exploration of the self and cosmopolitan musings—for alternative insights. It explores how Montaigne was read during the Second World War by three intellectuals to make sense of war: Stefan (...) Zweig, Jean Guéhenno, and François Mauriac. While Montaigne’s skepticism and turn to the self as an act of preservation was, in the 1930s, rejected as a strategy to combat rising authoritarianism in Europe by philosophers such as Max Horkheimer of the Frankfurt school, the thinkers studied here shed light on Montaigne as a source of active humanism based in reflective action that leads to Resistance. Building on trends in just war thinking that call for paying greater attention to the lived experience of war, the article identifies several psychological and moral processes—the inward turn, the cosmopolitan gaze, casting an existential anchor, and the humanist’s wager—to shed light on the doubt-laden process of making individual moral choices amidst the rising dogmatic forces that war tends to impose. (shrink)

En la desolación de la Francia en poder de las guerras de religión, para Montaigne, la imposibilidad de distinguir entre civilización y barbarie se enlaza al rechazo de la distinción misma entre el hombre y el animal: es el abandono del motivo humanístico de la grandeza y centralidad del hombre en el plano del universo. Sostiene, de hecho, una amistad 'pitagórica' con respecto a los animales. Están completamente ausentes en Montaigne aquellos animales fantásticos, monstruosos, que los bestiarios medievales a menudo (...) sitúan en regiones lejanas del espacio y el tiempo, y que una lábil frontera separaba de los animales reales. In the midst of France's desolation caused by the religious wars, Montaigne rejects the distinction between civilization and barbarism as much as the distinction between man and animal-which means a rejection to the humanistic idea of man's greatness and centrality regarding the universe. He supports, in fact, a "Pythagoric" friendship with animals. In Montaigne there will not be found those fantastic, monstrous animals that the medieval bestiaries located in a faraway space and time, and that only a labile line separated from real animals. (shrink)