Leibniz frequently argued that reasons are to be weighed against each other as in a pair of scales, as Professor Marcelo Dascal has shown in his article "The Balance of Reason." In this kind of weighing it is not necessary to reach demonstrative certainty – one need only judge whether the reasons weigh more on behalf of one or the other option However, a different kind of account about rational decision-making can be found in some of Leibniz's writings. In his (...) article "Was Leibniz's Deity an Akrates?" Professor Jaakko Hintikka has argued that Leibniz developed a new vectorial model for rational decisions which is better suited to complicated decisions, where values are complementary to each other. This model, related closely to his work in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, is a heuristic device which helps in finding rational combinations - and in an ideal case an optimum - between plural inclinations to the good. I shall argue that Leibniz applies more or less implicitly both of these models in his practical rationality. In simple situations he applied the pair of scales model and in more complicated situations he applied the vectorial model. (shrink)

This paper takes a fresh look at Johannes Clauberg’s Logica vetus et nova, in order to try to clarify its nature and character. Differently from prior readings of Clauberg that analyze his philosophy from the point of view of the construction of ‘ontology’, the approach of the present paper sees in Clauberg’s philosophy a late-Humanist work, accentuating his pedagogic and hermeneutical interests. Indeed, in Clauberg’s philosophy, hermeneutics and pedagogy are intrinsically bound together. This, the paper suggests, is supported not only (...) by the concrete subject-matters of his logic, but also by the examination of Clauberg’s milieu and of his sources. Analysis, in this framework, has a strictly hermeneutical usage. (shrink)

This volume takes cue from the idea that the thought of no philosopher can be understood without considering it as the result of a constant, lively dialogue with other thinkers, both in its internal evolution as well as in its reception, re-use, and assumption as a starting point in addressing past and present philosophical problems. In doing so, it focuses on a feature that is crucially emerging in the historiography of early modern philosophy and science, namely the complexity in the (...) production of knowledge. The book explores the applicability of this approach to a long-considered armchair philosopher, namely René Descartes, who is now more and more understood as a full-blown scientist, networker, and intellectual éminence grise rather than as the mere philosopher of the cogito, as well as the originator of different ‘Cartesianisms’ which encompassed many ideas and approaches for long captured by dichotomic historiographical categories as rationalism and empiricism, or speculative and experimental philosophy. The essays gathered in the volume aim to address the ways in which Descartes’s philosophy evolved and was progressively understood by scientists, philosophers, and intellectuals from different contexts and eras, either by considering direct interlocutors of Descartes such as Isaac Beeckman and Elisabeth of Bohemia, early modern thinkers who developed upon his ideas and on particular topics as Nicolas Malebranche or Thomas Willis, those who adapted his overall methodology in developing new systems of knowledge as Johannes Clauberg and Pierre-Sylvain Régis, and contemporary thinkers from continental and analytic traditions like Emanuele Severino and Peter Strawson. (shrink)

Contre la thèse qui réduit le raisonnement juridique à une simple rhétorique, l’article entend montrer que ce raisonnement répond à une exigence de vérité. Une telle démonstration exige de repenser la relation entre logique et rhétorique dans le champ juridique. La logique ici mobilisée est une logique de la probabilité, appropriée à la rationalité pragmatique. C’est du même coup la relation entre logique juridique et logique probabiliste qui se trouve interrogée, d’une part dans une perspective historique, d’autre part en tenant (...) compte des études contemporaines sur le sujet. (shrink)

Résumé Lucien Febvre proposait d’étudier comment se formait la raison des gens du XVIe siècle, notamment en langue, logique et mathématiques. Il se trouve que c’est autour de ces trois éléments que Jacques Peletier du Mans écrivit son L’algèbre en 1554 et René Descartes ses Regulae. J’avais montré ailleurs, par une étude lexicale, comment la notion de problème est cruciale dans les Regulae. Je mets ici en évidence les nombreuses correspondances entre les textes algébriques du XVIe siècle et les propos (...) de Descartes concernant la formulation de problèmes, où ils sont transformés en équations. Je montre aussi que, quand Peletier écrit « L’algèbre apprend à discourir », il explicite une posture épistémologique interne à l’algèbre abaciste qui prit consistance en Occident avec la réforme de la dialectique. L’algèbre en particulier et les mathématiques en général ont ainsi peu à peu pris la place de la dialectique comme un art de penser. (shrink)

Résumé Les arts libéraux tiennent un rôle particulier dans la pensée de Simon Stevin (1548-1620). Grâce à eux, ce savant peut dévoiler dans son épistémologie d’une part ce que sont les dispositions innées de l’esprit (distinguer le vrai du faux, parler, compter) et d’autre part les fondements des objets de la Nature (le nom, le nombre, la mesure et le poids). Un art de penser associe alors l’âme et la Création et permet de codifier les différents arts et l’action vertueuse. (...) Dans cet article, nous voulons montrer le rôle que jouent la dialectique et l’arithmétique dans l’art de penser de ce mathématicien et ingénieur flamand. Nous expliciterons alors les liens entre ces deux disciplines et la mise en place grâce à eux d’outils communs comme la proportion et la méthode dans la réalisation d’un projet encyclopédique. (shrink)

How can we portray the history of Renaissance knowledge production through the eyes of the students? Their university notebooks contained a variety of works, fragments of them, sentences, or simple words. To date, studies on these materials have only concentrated on a few individual works within the collections, neglecting the strategy by which texts and textual fragments were selected and the logic through which the notebooks were organized. The eight chapters that make up this volume explore students' note-taking practices behind (...) the creation of their notebooks from three different angles. The first considers annotation activities in relation to their study area to answer the question of how university disciplines were able to influence both the content and structure of their notebooks. The volume's second area of research focuses on the student's curiosity and choices by considering them expressions of a self-learning practice not necessarily linked to a discipline of study or instructions from teaching. The last part of the volume moves away from the student's desk to consider instructions on note-taking methods that students could receive from manuals of various kinds. (shrink)